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This dissertation examines the role subnational elites played in building national 
political parties. The dissertation advances the existing literature on party building 
(Aldrich 1995, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Hale 2006, Desposato and Scheiner 2008) in 
several respects. First, it brings to the foreground a set of actors--regional governors-- 
who have been previously ignored by the existing party-building literature. These actors 
have institutional resources, name recognition, and social capital that serve as the 
foundation for top-down construction of political parties because they become substitutes 
for mass-partisanship and salient socioeconomic cleavages that usually anchor political 
parties to the electorate. Second, it underscores the importance of political 
communication in the party building process, the value of which has escaped the existing 
literature on coalition maintenance in clientelistic regimes and/or dominant party states 
(Green 2007, Stokes 2005). Third, the dissertation advances scant literature on the quality 





CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In his seminal Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that U.S. 
federal institutions are sustained not by the letter of the law but by the democratic spirit 
of the people, their commitment to self-governance, their profound knowledge of state 
and national governmental powers, and a geographic location that shields the country 
from major wars. He also warned other nations against copying the U.S. constitution 
because it might fail to produce similar outcomes.1 Although two centuries have elapsed 
since de Tocqueville made this insightful observation, political science still lacks a theory 
of the impact of federalism on democratic consolidation. This gap is unfortunate because 
an increasing body of literature suggests that federal institutions may have hindered 
democratic consolidation in third-wave democracies.2  
This dissertation examines the impact of federalism on democratic consolidation 
through the prism of Russia’s derailed transition to democracy. In the blink of an eye, 
Russia metamorphosed from a pluralist regime into a political system in which regularly-
held elections serve to conceal suppression of opposition parties, frequent interrogations 
of NGOs by tax police, sporadic instances of electoral fraud, and tight state control over 
the mass media. At first, this transformation appeared to be orchestrated single-handedly 
by President Vladimir Putin, who after eight years in office left the country more 
centralized, less democratic, and more hostile to the west. Yet a closer examination 
                                                 
1Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row Inc., 1966) , pp 152-
172. 
2 Edward Gibson, “Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries,” World 
Politics 58, (October 2005): 101-32; Rebecca Bill Chavez, “The Construction of the Rule of Law in 
Argentina: A Tale of Two Provinces,” Comparative Politics 35 (July 2003); Richard Snyder, “After the 
State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico,” in Subnational 
Politics and Democratization in Mexico, ed. W. Cornelius, T. Eisenstadt, and J. Hindley (La Jolla, CA: 




reveals that federal institutions partially contributed to the rise of a quasi-authoritarian 
state. 
As in Southern Europe and Latin America, democratization in Russia was 
initiated by elites who crafted democratic institutions and handed them down to a passive 
electorate that did not always share the same democratic ideals. Given that the elite 
consensus served as one of the major factors promoting democratic reforms, federal 
institutions facilitated democratization at first by allowing the liberal reformers to keep 
divisive issues (including implementation and timing of  reforms) off the negotiation 
table and letting regional officials work out troublesome details.  
This strategy backfired, however, because it transformed regional elites into 
vociferous supporters of the status quo, which permitted abuses of public office for 
personal gain. Subsequently, regional elites altered the trajectory of Russia’s 
democratization by distorting institutional reforms that should have strengthened 
democracy. The reforms abolished single-member districts used between 1995-2003 to 
elect national legislators, mandated nationwide creation of regional party branches, and 
increased campaign and party finances transparency. In theory, these reforms should 
have reinforced democratization because they were aimed at making parties more 
cohesive and better connected to the electorate. In practice, however, these reforms 
strengthened party discipline in the parliament without making parties more 
programmatic, increased the number of party branches in the regions without at the same 
time promoting interaction between parties and voters, integrated national and regional 
party organizations without improving government accountability.  
This study seeks to explain why the reforms went astray by considering 
gubernatorial involvement in national elections and national policy making. From the 
onset gubernatorial support toward the presidential party, United Russia, took a form 
unprecedented for Western countries: governors ran on the United Russia ticket, duly 
won seats but then voluntarily abdicated them in favor of candidates ranked lower on the 
party ballot. In 1999, only 5 of 89 governors were involved in such swapping of seats; by 
2007 this number increased to 64.  
The first empirical chapter depicts elections as an intra-elite bargaining process 
that occurs without regard to constituents interests. It illustrates how opaque nature of 
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candidate nomination and inadequate party and election finance laws gave rise to special 
interest coalitions dominated by regional governors. Party bosses had to coalesce with 
governors to compensate for inadequate partisan resources and in exchange, made the 
governors de facto gatekeepers to the ballot. This chapter reveals fundamental difference 
in intra-party politics between Russia and Western democracies. In the West, intra-party 
conflicts unfold over “policy, office, or votes,” while in Russia exchange of personal 
favors between governors and Moscow constitutes the essence of intra-party bargaining.3  
The second empirical chapter examines how these special-interest coalitions were 
able to mobilize popular support. Governors cued the masses on how to vote by creating 
an information blockade around the opposition candidates and also by appealing to voter 
regional identities. They emphasized that the specific party would represent the best 
regional interests. As rational actors, voters weighted gubernatorial endorsements against 
the costs of obtaining unbiased information about the opposition candidates. Voters who 
faced steep costs of collecting this information, voted for the party endorsed by the 
governor, voters who could easily obtain the information about other parties were less 
prone to gubernatorial cueing.   
  The third empirical chapter shifts attention from elections to policy-making. 
Since governors served as intermediaries between voters and national parties during 
elections, this chapter examines the extent of gubernatorial influence on legislator voting 
behavior. The chapter shows that legislators elected with gubernatorial help were more 
likely to support measures that advanced gubernatorial narrow interests even when these 
bills hindered regional democratization.  
These three chapters reveal that gubernatorial involvement in national elections 
distorted incumbent-constituents linkages. Gubernatorial political machines reduced party 
leaders’ incentive to reach out directly to voters and encouraged parties compete instead 
for gubernatorial support. However, when the elections were over, governors remained 
aloof from the national-policy making process, while disorganized voters lacked any 
meaningful channels for reaching incumbents in Moscow.          
                                                 
3 Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, Policy, Office, or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe 
Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Although this dissertation is based on data from one country only, its implications 
extend beyond Russian borders because it advances the literature on democratization in 
three respects. Unlike previous studies, which dichotomized their dependent variable as 
democracy and non-democracy, this study focuses on a quasi-democratic regime that 
holds regular elections but  lacks such other key democratic attributes as an impartial 
state and the rule of law, autonomous civic and economic societies, and free mass media.4 
In the mid-1990s, political scientists considered such regimes as transitory outcomes, but 
now an increasing number of scholars argue that partial democratization became a 
permanent condition in many countries world-wide.5 This study explains how such a 
partial democratization can be sustained.   
This study also shows how federalism shapes intra-elite bargaining over the 
choice of regime and, in doing so, generates a set of hypotheses about the relationship 
between federalism and democracy relevant to the debate on democratic consolidation in 
third-wave democracies and the literature on political development of the United States.6 
These hypotheses cannot be generated on the basis of the existing theories of 
democratization because they assume that negotiation over the type of regime takes place 
in an institutional vacuum and that therefore the actors who control the state have 
homogeneous preferences. This study places heterogeneity of state actors’ preferences in 
the center of analysis and goes on to illustrate how alternative federal arrangements affect 
actors’ preferences for the type of regime.     
Finally, this dissertation integrates the existing studies of center-periphery 
relations and party politics in Russia into the mainstream comparative literature on 
institutional determinants of political behavior.7 Although Latin American countries and 
                                                 
4 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as A Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, 
eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Carles Boix, 
Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson, Economic Origins of Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
5 Larry J. Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 21-35; 
Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism  (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006) 
6 Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation: 
The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press-Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1992); Robert Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie: 
The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, forthcoming).     
7 Daniel S. Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and 
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Russia face similar obstacles to democratic consolidation -- over-powerful presidents, 
under-institutionalized parties, weak civic society, and rampant corruption, studies about 
Latin American and Russian political development have been conducted in isolation from 
each other. 8 This project illustrates how federalism can be used as a unifying theme for a 
comparative analysis of the challenges to democratic consolidation world-wide.              
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Henry E. Hale, Why 
not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (Cambridge and  New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Grigorii V. Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy 
Unclaimed (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Regina Smyth, Candidate Strategies and 
Electoral Competition in the Russian Federation: Democracy without Foundation (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
8 Edward Gibson, ed., Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2004); David Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge and 
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CHAPTER 2  





Source: Noviye Izvestiya (October 12, 2006) 
Abstract:  
 This paper advances the literature on democratization and federalism by showing 
that federal institutions can create incentives and open opportunities for the formation of 
rent-seeking coalitions between regional incumbents and national party bosses. It 
develops a simple game theory model to predict when such coalitions will be formed and 
tests it using a unique panel dataset on Russian party finances, regional elites’ 
backgrounds, and regional socioeconomic conditions. The paper finds that these 
coalitions are more likely to form when national political parties lack adequate resources 
and when regional elites have heterogeneous interests. The findings of the paper 
challenge the conventional wisdom that subnational governments serve as training 
grounds for national elites.   
Introduction 
 Over the past decade, scholarly interest in the relationship between federalism and 
democracy intensified worldwide as evidence accumulated that the Third Wave of 
democratization was at best superficial and failed to eliminate authoritarian rule at the 
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subnational level.1 Partial democratization resulted from the devolution of decision-
making authority to the subnational governments, unaccompanied by concurrent 
strengthening of the mechanisms for keeping incumbents accountable to electorates. This 
mismatch created a strong incentive for regional actors to preserve the status quo and to 
delay building national political parties, an independent judiciary, a free mass media, and 
other institutions required for democratic consolidation. The resistance of subnational 
actors to democratic consolidation then gives rise to the following question: How to 
persuade local elites who benefited from partial reforms to participate in building of new 
democratic institutions while at the same time shielding already existing ones from 
contamination by authoritarian practices?  
 This study addresses this question through the prism of Russia’s failed transition 
to democracy. When President Putin assumed office in 2000, his goal became to create a 
party system with nation-wide geographic coverage, which he achieved by attracting 
regional elites to the United Russia party. 2 However, regional elite support manifested 
itself in a peculiar form: they ran on the United Russia ticket, won votes, but after having 
qualified for parliamentary seats, abdicated them in favor of candidates ranked lower on 
the party ballot. In both 2003 and 2007 Duma elections, one third of United Russia 
                                                 
1 David Samuels, “Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The “New Politics of the Governors in Brazil,” 
Publius 30 (Spring 2000); Edward Gibson, Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004); Rebecca Bill Chavez, “The Construction of the Rule of Law in 
Argentina: A Tale of Two Provinces,” Comparative Politics 35 (July 2003); Vladimir Gel’man and Tomila 
Lankina, “Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions: Explaining Institutional Choices in Russia’s Local 
Government,” Post-Soviet Affairs 24 (January 2008): 40-62; Edward L. Gibson, “Boundary Control: 
Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries,” World Politics 58 (October 2005):101-32; Patrick 
Heller, “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,” World Politics 52 (July 2000): 
484-519; Kelly M. McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and 
Kyrgyzstan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Konstantin 
Sonin, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from Bankruptcy 
Law Transplant,” Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (June 2007):254-77; Richard Snyder, “After the 
State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico,” in Subnational 
Politics and Democratization in Mexico, ed. W. Cornelius, T. Eisenstadt, and J. Hindley (La Jolla, CA: 
Center for U.S. –Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1999); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 
Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997). 
2 Ora John Reuter and Thomas Remington, “Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The 
Case of United Russia,” Comparative Political Studies 42 (April 2009): 501-526. 
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candidates eligible to become national deputies turned down this opportunity, making it 
possible for candidates ranked lower on the party ballot to get seated.3  
 Party bosses’ behind the scenes manipulation who gets to serve as a Duma deputy 
severely compromised the essence of elections as “instruments of democracy.” As Powell 
points out, in a proportional system, elections present voters with an opportunity to 
choose delegates who will bargain on their behalf with other parties.4 The replacement of 
elected candidates by actors unfamiliar to the electorate deprives voters of their delegates, 
thus destroying the links between incumbents and constituents and undermining popular 
trust in political parties. Furthermore, it reduces legislative professionalism because 
instead of sending professional politicians to the national parliament, the ruling party 
distributes seats to candidates with little or no policy-making experience.     
 How did this practice arise in Russia? Why did professional politicians agree to 
enter electoral competition if they did not seek a seat in a higher office? How does this 
practice affect the quality of governance? Russia is not the only country that has 
witnessed this phenomenon.  The United States and Columbia in the past and Brazil in 
the present have also struggled to retain in the office candidates who won congressional 
seats. Since the Congress had fewer patronage and pork resources than state assemblies, 
politicians used national legislature as an opportunity to jumpstart their political careers 
in the state.  Centralization of powers by the national government made this practice 
extinct in Columbia and the U.S.5 Russia’s experience, however, deviates from this trend 
because the phenomenon of surrendered seats became more prevalent after more power 
became consolidated in Moscow.  
 I begin by discussing the institutional and attitudinal channels that enabled 
regional politicians influence the outcomes of national elections.  I then develop a game 
theory model that provides insights into how intra-elite competition affected the 
                                                 
3 “Central Election Commission of Russian Federation, Decree N 72/620-4 (December 24, 2003)” 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (December 27,2003);  “Gosduma Kotoruyu Ne Vybirali,” Gazeta.ru at  
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/elections2007/articles/ 2424868.shtml (February 16, 2008)  
4 G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Elections as Instruments of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000).  
5 David Samuels, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), Chapter 3; James Sterling Young, The Washington Community 1800-1828 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 86-90; James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).  
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probability of alliance between regional office holders and the presidential party. I test 
the predictions of the model using a unique dataset on party finances. I conclude by 
discussing the relationship between federalism and democratic consolidation.    
 This paper contributes to the literature on democratic consolidation, political 
parties, and federalism by uncovering conditions without which democracy cannot 
flourish in a federal state. The key implication of this study is that regional politicians’ 
aspirations for national office combined with compatible distribution of resources 
between national parties and regional incumbents create a solid foundation for 
democratic consolidation. Local politicians’ national ambitions expand the pool of 
qualified candidates who can challenge national officeholders, while compatible 
distribution of resources between national parties and regional incumbents promotes 
merit-based selection of candidates.    
Part I: Governors and Mayors in National Elections 
 For their help with voter mobilization, the candidates who run but subsequently 
abdicate their seats are referred to by the Russian media as “locomotives” (parovozi) that 
head a train and propel the movement of the attached cars, but retreat to the roundhouse 
as soon as the election ends. Although the metaphor of a locomotive-candidate is 
commonly used by the Russian media, I will refer hereafter to candidates who win seats 
but decline to become deputies as “poster-candidates.” A within-party transfer of seats is 
possible because Russia uses a proportional system with multi-member districts and thus 
the transfer of seats does not require holding an additional election. But there are two 
loopholes that allow parties to abuse the system: the absence of penalties for the party 
when its candidates surrender their seats and the constitutional ambiguity that allows 
incumbents to run for a second office while still holding a first. This legal void became 
first glaringly apparent in 2006 regional elections when the Folk Will party (Narodnaya 
Volya) nominated its leader as a candidate on the ballot simultaneously in six electoral 
districts.6 A year later, in the 2007 Duma elections United Russia pushed this practice 
even further by nominating the incumbent president Vladimir Putin on its ballot as one of 
the candidates for a legislative seat. 
                                                 
6 Kira Vasil’eva, “Postoy, ‘Parovoz’: S Podstavnimy Kandidatatami v Partiynikh Spiskakh Ustal Borot’sya 
Dazhe TsIK ,” Noviye Izvestiya, October 12, 2008. 
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 In the light of these abuses, Alexander Vishnyakov, the head of the Central 
Election Commission, lobbied the Duma in vain to close this loophole by introducing 
penalties for parties whose candidates refuse to become deputies. However, his effort 
failed because the proposed changes would primarily have impacted on United Russia, 
the party with the highest number of poster candidates. In 2003, 39 percent of candidates 
nominated on the United Russia ballot declined to get seated, compared to 2 percent for 
the Communist Party (KPRF) and none for Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR). Similarly, 
in 2007, United Russia nominated a substantially greater number of poster candidates 
than the two other parties (Table 2-1).     
 The effects of selection process on the quality of representation can be assessed 
by comparing professional backgrounds of poster candidates with the candidates sent to 
parliament instead of them (Table 2-2). While regional officials comprised an 
overwhelming majority of poster candidates (74.5 %), 24 percent of their seats were 
transferred to businessmen and 40 percent to national officeholders. The fact that 
businessmen enter the Duma through the backdoor opened by poster candidates is 
unsurprising in the light of anti-business attitudes of the electorate. But the prevalence of 
national policymakers among candidates who got reelected with the help of poster 
candidates points to the weakness of links between national deputies and their 
constituents.   
 Out of all regional officials, the heads of regions, governors, were most likely to 
run as poster candidates. In 1999, they accounted for 88 percent, in 2003, for 75 percent, 
and in 2007 for 63 percent of poster candidates. Governors also ran as poster candidates 
in 39 regional elections held between 2004 and 2008.   
 Governors have more patronage resources than national officeholders because 
they control de facto federal employees by providing them with office space and housing, 
and other perquisites of office.7 This allows governors to turn state resources into 
electioneering tools. As Hale shows, governors rely on their political machines not only 
to secure office for themselves but also to get national legislators elected. Governors’ 
                                                 
7 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
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political machines are especially effective on the periphery as well as in regions with a 
high percentage of population receiving monetary transfers from the state.8      
 Russian scholars frequently refer to governors’ political machines as 
“administrative resources” (administrativniy resurs); i.e., the situation in which 
incumbents exploit the state.9 Governors tailor administrative resources to the specific 
stages of a campaign. At the registration stage, governors, who appoint the heads of the 
Regional Election Commissions (REC), can use their control over the RECs to increase 
the costs of entry to the opposition parties. Numerous newspaper articles suggest that the 
RECs employ double standards while reviewing the paperwork submitted by the 
opposition and pro-Kremlin candidates.10  At the campaigning stage, governors can 
create an information blockade for the opposition by restricting its access to local TV 
stations, social events, and workplaces.  Governors can also slow down the campaign of 
the opposition parties by sending tax police to their campaign office to examine financial 
records.11 On the day of election, gubernatorial staffs work the polling stations to inflate 
both turnout and party vote share.   
 Besides administrative resources, name recognition is another factor that makes 
governor a valuable ally to the party he decides to support. In the western political 
science literature, it is a convention to think of party labels as information shortcuts. The 
acquisition of information about candidates is costly, and voters use party labels as 
shortcuts for deciding whom to vote for.12 In Russia, the situation is reversed because 
parties are numerous, ephemeral, and non-programmatic. In 2003, 32 parties competed 
for the national office, and in 2007, 11. As survey evidence suggests, bewildered voters 
                                                 
8 Henry Hale, “Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized Ethnicity, and Post-Communist 
Transition,” ft. 3 supra. 
9 For a discussion of similar practice at the national level see Anna Grzymala-Busse,  “Political 
Competition and the Politicization of the State,” Comparative Political Studies  (December 2003); Andrey 
Y. Chuklinov, “Administrativniy Resurs: Problemi Upravlencheskogo Metoda,” Otechestvenniye Zapiski 2 
(2004) at http://magazines.russ.ru/oz/2004/2/2004_2_29-pr.html (February 3, 2008).  
10 Viktor Khamrayev, “The Russian Federation. Elections: 'A Precedent With Far-Reaching Consequences,” 
The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 40 (November 1, 2006); Nabi Abdullaev, “Battling to Get 
Back on Ballot,” The Moscow Times (January 30, 2007): 3; “Stat’ Deputatom ot Lyuboy Partii 
Udovol’stvie ne Deshevoe,” at http://www.compromat.ru/main/duma/mestavspiske.htm (January 12, 2008). 
11 O.A. Matveychev and V.Y. Novikov, Predvibornanya Kompaniya: Praktika Protiv Teorii 
(Yekaterinburg: The University of Ural Press, 2003), Chapter 3 at http://www.matveychev.ru (February 3, 
2008). 
12 Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in 
Political Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (4) (October 2001): 951-71.   
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frequently lack a feel for party policy positions, and, hence base their choices on other 
heuristics, such party leaders’ personalities.13 Governors’ names on a ballot can have 
similar cuing effect because their endorsements of candidates do not go unnoticed. When, 
after the 2003 Duma election, respondents were asked if governors supported any party,   
56 percent (n=341) of respondents were able to correctly recall the party’s name.14 
Respondents’ attitudes toward parties and governors provide additional evidence that 
governors’ names on ballots may increase party popularity. Surveys reveal that 
respondents rank governor influence higher than political parties. Table 2-3 compares the 
frequency distribution of responses to questions about relative importance of parties and 
governors. Between 13 and 15 percent of respondents consider governors important 
political actors in Russia’s politics, but only slightly more than 5 percent think that 
political parties are “very important.” Thus, by placing a governor on a ballot the party 
may increase its credibility among the electorate, especially among voters in rural areas 
who tend to be less educated and less politically knowledgeable and voters distant from 
Moscow who seldom interact with national policymakers. 
 Governors’ names are more familiar to voters than party policy positions not only 
because governors are less numerous but also they have been in office longer than most 
of the parties. In December 2007, an average gubernatorial term was seven years, 
whereas, only two parties in the 2007 Duma election (KPRF and LDPR) have been in 
office for more than seven years.  
 Incumbent governors can be grouped into three cohorts based on the time their 
first term began: the old guards, populists, and loyalists. The old guards cohort comprises 
seven regional leaders who have been in office since 1991 or 1992 and were recruited 
from the former members of the Soviet nomenklatura even before the ratification of the 
democratic constitution. Neither the introduction of popular elections for governors in 
1996, nor President Putin’s reform that abolished gubernatorial elections affected 
political destinies of this “magnificent seven.” These seven governors built their own 
regional parties, won several successive elections, and, later, got reappointed by President 
                                                 
13 Henry E. Hale, “Parties to Manipulation: Russia as a Case Study in Hybrid Regime Partisanship,” Paper 
Presented at the AAASS annual meeting, 2007, p. 12; Ted Brader and Josh Tucker, It’s Nothing 
Personal?  The Appeal of Party Leaders and the Development of Partisanship in Russia,” at 
http://as.nyu.edu/object/JoshuaTucker.html. 
14 Author’s estimates using Colton’s survey data.  
15 
 
Putin.15 The populist cohort is the most numerous and comprised 49 governors who came 
to office in the mid-1990s after winning the first-ever Russia’s gubernatorial elections. 
Thus, their political fortunes were closely linked to regional economies and they were 
more likely to get reelected in regions where real wages grew faster than the national 
average. They won votes by pressing businessmen to share profits with workers and by 
increasing budgetary outlays to public sector employees. 16 The loyalist cohort comprises 
25 governors who were appointed by Putin after 2004, the year when gubernatorial 
elections were abolished. This group includes prominent businessmen and former 
members of the president administration and the cabinet.  
  The above classification of governors suggests that in 2007, at the time when 
United Russia was only entering its second election, 75 percent of the governors had been 
in office for longer than the party. They could present to the electorate a long list of 
accomplishments that was more impressive than party platforms. Therefore governors’ 
names on the United Russia ballot functioned to increase party credibility.   
Part II: Governors and their Rivals: Regional Party Bosses and Mayors   
 This section explains why governors enter elections but then abdicate their seats.  
Access to patronage resources constitutes one of these motivations. In the political 
science literature, the term “patronage” is a convention describing the distribution of 
positions in the public sector in exchange for votes. In Russia, however, slots on a party 
ballot are an alternative method of awarding constituents. Lobbying by professional 
organizations is still in a nascent stage in Russia; therefore, many large business 
corporations seek to influence policy outcomes by turning their top executives into Duma 
deputies. They are even willing to bribe party leaders to get nominated. According to 
informal sources, safe slots on the LDPR ballot were sold for as much as $5 million in the 
2007 Duma election and between $70,000 and $230,000 in regional elections. 17 So, the 
                                                 
15 Y.A. Solov’yev, Vizhivshiy Regional’niy Lider Epokhi Peremen (Moscow: Al’pina Business Books, 
2006); Institut Sovremennoy Politiki, Vlast’: Gubernatori Rossii (Moscow: SOLID Press, 1996). 
16 Andrew Konitzer, Voting for Russia’s Governors:  Regional Elections and Accountability under Yeltsin 
and Putin (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 160-69. 
17 Pavel Tolstikh, “Lobbisty Chetvertogo Soziva,” Russia’s center for the Studying of Business 
Governmnet Relations  (December 10, 2007) at < http://www.lobbying.ru/index.php?article_id 
=2525&link_id=16> (February 7, 2008); Igor’ Bel’skikh, “Mesto v Spiske,” Delovoe Povolzh'ye (July 22, 
2005); Valeriy Tseplayev, “Analis: Tayni Partiynikh Spiskov,” Argumenty i Fakty (October 13, 1999); 
Mikhail V’yugin, “Politica-Economica: Zamikaniye v Yacheyke,” Vremya Novostey  (November 8, 2005): 
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actors who control the access to party ballot can enrich themselves by granting slots 
selectively to businessmen and other special interests. 
 Opaque process of candidate selection facilitates such abuses. Candidates are 
nominated at party caucuses, ironically called “primaries,” and restrict the number of 
actors who can vote on potential nominees to a handful of specially designated delegates 
from local party branches. Delegates cast votes usually on already prepackaged slates of 
candidates.  
 Parties grant the power to organize party caucuses and select candidates to party 
first secretaries (hereafter, party bosses) who control the nomination process. Party 
bosses are elected by rank-and-file party members to manage party regional branches. 
Since these positions are unpaid, party bosses also hold regular jobs. In one third of the 
regions, party bosses are regional deputies or speakers in regional assemblies, in the other 
third, they are employed in non-profit sector, and only in three regions are these positions 
held by governors. Since the party leadership relies on party as an instrument of oversight 
over governors, governors’ control of party organization is strongly discouraged by 
Moscow (Table 2-4).    
Formal Model of Candidate Selection 
 The process of candidate selection can be represented by a simple sequential 
game of complete and perfect information involving two players: Party Boss and 
Governor.  Party Boss moves first by offering Governor the number of slots on the party 
ballot: ],0[ Ng ∈ , where N is the total number seats contested.  After observing g, 
Governor rejects (R) or accepts (A). The payoffs are as follows:    
 Governor accepts Governor rejects 
Governor g Gw  
Party Boss gwc −  0w  
 
where, Gw  is Governor’s reservation threshold, i.e. the value that he derives from not 
being nominated by the party; 0w  is Party Boss’ reservation threshold. These thresholds 
                                                                                                                                                 
4; Aleksander Deryabin, “Valeriy Khomyakov: ‘Parityniye Budzheti Delo Temnoye’,”Nezavisimaia gazeta 




can be thought of as actors’ confidence in their own skills and resources with higher 
degree of confidence corresponding to a higher threshold.     
 The existence of a solution will depend on the values of Gw , 0w  and cw . For now 
assume that Gc www ≥− 0 ; i.e., Party Boss’ surplus from forming a coalition is greater 
than Governor’s reservation threshold. Since Party Boss seeks to maximize his surplus 
from forming a coalition, he will offer the smallest number of seats that Governor will 
accept. Governor will accept any offer that leaves him with a higher payoff than his 
reservation threshold.  Sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game consists of the 
following strategies:  For a given value of g, Governor will accept if Gwg ≥ , and will 
reject otherwise, while Party Boss will offer g= Gw . For any offer lower than Gw ,  the 
equilibrium number of seats received by Governor  (g*) will be zero, for any offer equal 
to or higher than Gw , g*= Gw .  
 The equilibrium offer (g*) must satisfy two inequalities: Gwg ≥*  and 
0* wwg c −≤ , and these conditions are presented graphically in  Figure 2-1.  Governor 
will accept any offer to the right of Gw , while Party Boss, will offer number of seats only 
up to and including the point 0wwc − . A coalition will be formed when the acceptance 
regions overlap, i.e. the interval [ Gc www ,0−  ]  is not empty. This interval shrinks when 
1) Gw  increases; 2) 0w  increases; 3) Cw  decreases. Therefore, to understand when 
Governor and Party Boss form coalitions we need to examine the factors that affect the 
values of Gc www ,, 0  . 
Factors that affect the value of 0w  
 The gain from governor’s participation will be higher in regions where party 
bosses lack resources to mobilize electorate. Party needs personnel to collect signatures 
required to register the party, motor-vehicles to conduct a door-to-door campaign in rural 
areas, and money to pay for the advertisement in media. The more resources the party 
boss has the more seats he expects to win without gubernatorial support. Therefore, the 
party boss who controls more resources has a higher value of 0w  and, hence, will be less 
likely to form coalitions with the governor.   
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 I use two constructs for party resources: annual financial contributions from the 
central office to the regional party organization, and the number of cars by the regional 
party office. These data are reported in the annual financial statements that parties are 
required to submit to tax authorities under the Law on Parties of 2003.  Table 2-5 
summarizes within-party allocations and car ownership for the period 2003- 2006. 
Although during this period the allocations to regional branches grew persistently, vast 
disparities between the central office in Moscow and the periphery remained. In 2004, the 
central office owned 14 cars while 30 of 84 regional offices did not own any; the market 
value for an average car owned by the Moscow office was about $47,500, while the 
average market value for a car in a region was only $5,000. 
 Using these data, it is possible to test the following hypothesis:  
H1: ceteris paribus, the probability that a governor will become a poster candidate will 
be positively correlated with party financial resources (substitution hypothesis).  
Factors that affect the value of cw    
   The number of seats won by a coalition will depend on governor’s popularity. 
Although a share of popular vote is a conventional measure of an incumbent popularity, 
these data are not available for Russian governors because since 2005 they have been 
appointed by the president. Therefore, the number of years a governor has been in office 
was used instead. This construct seeks to capture the extent of governor’s clientelist 
networks. As Carpenter demonstrates, the time bureaucrats spend in office affects the 
extensiveness of their social ties with influential civic society organizations and policy 
think tanks. Those networks become especially valuable when bureaucrats seek to build 
coalition behind policies and push them through Congress.18 In a similar manner, the time 
spent in office will affect the effectiveness with which the incumbent governor mobilizes 
the electorate during elections. Furthermore, the governors who stayed in office longer 
will have a better name recognition. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2: ceteris paribus, the probability that a governor will become a poster candidate will 
be positively correlated with the length of his term in office (incumbency advantage 
hypothesis). 
                                                 
18 Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
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Factors that affect the values of Gw  
 Recall that Gw  measures governor’s utility when he does not run. This value will 
be lower when a party boss forms a coalition with governor’s rivals, among whom are 
mayors of large cities.  Conflicts between governors and mayors are frequently prompted 
by their disagreements over budgetary and pricing policies. The Soviet industrial policy 
encouraged the formation of cities around giant factories which used to contribute funds 
to city and regional budgets and to provide municipal services. They built schools and 
apartment buildings for their employees, provided health care and utility services to city 
dwellers, and paved roads.  With the transition to a free-market economy, not all of those 
enterprises were able to restructure and become profitable in a new economic 
environment. Some of them continued to operate under a soft-budget constraint and from 
donors turned into recipients of city and/or regional funds. Therefore, the speed with 
which enterprises were able to restructure had a direct impact on the economic position of 
the city relative to the rest of the region. Cities with high concentration of unrestructured 
enterprises became recipients of funds from regional budgets, whereas, cities with a high 
concentrations of profitable enterprises, became donors. As a result of this growing 
economic stratification between the central city and the rest of the region, urban-rural 
conflict on the budgetary allocations intensified. Donor cities started to demand a greater 
fiscal autonomy from the region, while recipient cities began to lobby for higher fiscal 
transfers from the regional budgets.  Price liberalization aggravated this conflict further. 
Since the majority of food commodities is produced outside of the city but consumed by 
city residents, any price ceiling imposed by the regional government redistributes wealth 
from the rural areas to the city. Therefore, cities became strong supporters of price 
ceilings.     
 The conflict between the central city and the rest of the region manifests itself in 
the mayoral attempts to unseat the incumbent governor and the governor’s desire to get 
rid of an uncontrollable mayor.  This conflict frequently intensifies during the selection of 
candidates. For example, in Pskovskaya oblast the governor Kuznetsov and mayors of 
two region’s biggest cities, Pskov and Velikiye Luki, deadlocked selecting candidates for 
both Duma and regional election.  In Kalmikiya, the confrontation between the governor 
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and the mayor of the region’s largest city, Elista, resulted in the purges of delegates loyal 
to mayor from the United Russia ballot.         
 One way to measure the extent of this conflict is to look at the difference in per 
capita industrial output of the central city and the rest of the region. This suggests the 
following hypothesis:  
H3: ceteris paribus, the probability that a governor will become a poster candidate will 
be positively correlated with the differences in per capita output of the city and the rest of 
the region (conflict of interests hypothesis).        
Part III: Model Specification and Results 
  This section estimates equation (1) using a probit specification:  








        (2-1) 
Where, i indexes a governor; j, a region; t, a year. The variable Transfers is per capita 
transfers received from Moscow by a party office in region j in year t. The variable Cars 
is the number of cars per capita owned by the party office in region j in year t. The 
variable YearsInOffice is the number of years a governor has been in office. The two 
variables CityDonor and CityRecipient measure the difference between per capita output 



















where rgnOutput is per capita industrial output in the region net of the central city output. 
The variable z is a vector of controls: 1) vote share won by United Russia in the 2003 
Duma election to account for the safety of the region; 2) population density of the region 
to account for cross-regional differences in the cost of campaigning; 3) governor’s age to 
account for possible cross-generation differences in aspirations for higher office.  A 
detailed description of each variable and summary statistics is provided in Appendix A.  
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 The sample includes 131 observations that include the 2007 Duma election 
regional elections held between March 2004 and March 2007. 
 The estimated regression coefficients are reported in Table 6. I start by including 
one variable at a time and then estimate a fully-specified model. The sign of the 
coefficients on the party resources, governor resources, and conflict of interest variables 
are consistent with the three hypotheses above and remain the same for all specifications.  
However, when control variables are included, the coefficient on the Transfer variable 
becomes insignificant. Of the two conflict of interest variables, the coefficient is 
significant only for the CityRecipient variable suggesting that governors become poster 
candidates to prevent election of actors who support greater redistribution of resources 
from the region to the poor city.  
 Figure 2 plots predicted probabilities of observing that a governor will be a poster 
candidate for different values of the Transfers, Years in Office, and City Recipient 
variables. Since these three variables are measured in different units, it is useful to 
compare their effects by looking at standard deviations from the mean. The labels on the 
x-axes denote the mean, one standard deviation from the mean, and two standard 
deviations from the mean. For a region with a mean value of Transfers variable, the 
probability of observing a governor running as a poster candidate is 73 percent and  
degreases to 60 percent Transfers go up by one deviation. This finding suggests that party 
bosses compensate for the shortfalls in their own resources by turning to governors for 
help.  
 As predicted by the incumbency effect hypothesis, the variable yearsInOffice is 
positively correlated with governor’s participation. For a region where a governor has 
been in office for 7 years (mean value) the predicted probability that he will run on the 
United Russia ballot is 60 percent and increases to almost 80 percent as governor’s stay 
in office increases by one deviation. It suggests that party bosses prefer to nominate 
governors from the old guard and the populist cohort rather than from the cohort 
appointed by Putin. As the coefficient on the pcUnitedRussia2003 variable suggests, the 
party avoids nominating governors from traditionally communist regions where United 
Russia performed poorly in 2003 election.       
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 The last graph focuses on the effect of the differences in the output. Governors are 
more likely to become poster candidates when the city is a recipient of regional funds. 
When the gap between regional output exceeds city’s per capita output by 21 rubles (or 
$0.85) the probability that a governor will head the party list is about 70 percent and 
increases to 83 percent for regions with one standard deviation above the mean.   
Conclusion 
 Over the past decade, empirical evidence that the relationship between democracy 
and federalism is non-linear has been growing: the cleavage structure of the electorate, a 
starting point of the transition, and the intensity of party competition have been identified 
as factors affecting the speed of democratic consolidation at the subnational level.19  This 
paper took this research a step further by demonstrating that subnational authoritarian 
regimes can contaminate nascent democratic institutions by authoritarian practices. By 
forming rent-seeking coalitions with regional incumbents, United Russia party bosses 
expanded the party popular base. However, this goal was achieved by exploiting 
resources of the subnational governments and circumventing a merit-based selection of 
candidates.  Such behind-the-scenes manipulation of who gets nominated and seated 
made the candidate selection process opaque and undemocratic, undermined voters’ trust 
toward parties, and diminished national legislators’ professionalism.   
 This finding suggests that campaign and party finance laws can be one of the 
factors that can speed or derail democratization. When these laws omit the procedures for 
within-party distribution of funds, this loophole allows party leaders to spend most of the 
resources to finance the operation of the central office, leaving party branches in the 
periphery under-funded and desperate for external assistance from regional incumbents. 
The latter, then, by politicizing state resources, undermine democratic consolidation from 
bellow. Therefore, studies of democratization should pay more attention on the effects of 
within-party distribution of funds and laws regulating party finances on democratic 
consolidation.   
 
                                                 
19 Rebecca Bill Chavez, “The Construction of the Rule of Law in Argentina: A Tale of Two Provinces,” 
Comparative Politics 35 (July 2003); Edward L. Gibson, “Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism 
in Democratic Countries,” World Politics 58 (October 2005):101-32; Patrick Heller, “Degrees of 
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Table 2-1               Distribution of Poster Candidates by Parties, 1999-2007 
 Poster Candidate per Number of Party Seats in Duma (%) 
 1999 2003 2007 
Parties of Power a  20.00 38.95 33.02 
LDPR 2.00 0.00 5.00 
KPRF 4.21 2.00 5.26 
a  For 1999, refers to Unity, Fatherland All Russia, and Our Home is Russia, for 2003 and 2007, United 
Russia, Sources: Central Election Commission, Decrees N67/768-3 (January 9, 2000),  N67/767-3 (January 
9, 2000), N67/769-3 (January 9, 2000), N67/770-3 (January 9, 2000),  N72/620-4 (December 24, 2003), 
N72/621 (December 24, 2003), N73/592-5 (December 13, 2007), N73/593-5 (December 13, 2007), 
N73/595-5 (December 13, 2007), N74/607-5 (December 14, 2007), N 75/609 (December 14, 2007), 




Table 2-2  Professional Background of Poster and Seated Candidates, 1999-2007 
 Poster Candidates Seated Candidates 
Occupation prior to elections  %  % 
Regional elected officials 117 74.52 31 19.75 
Mayors  12 7.64 2 1.27 
National deputies or cabinet members 10 6.37 63 40.13 
Businessmen 7 4.46 38 24.2 
Not-for-profit 8 5.1 19 12.1 
Other 3 1.91 4 2.55 
Total  157 100 157 100 
Sources: Compiled by the author using lists of registered by the Central Election Commission candidates 










Table 2-3                            Attitudes toward Parties and Governors 
respondents who think that: 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
parties play very important role in Russia 5.4% 7.1% 5.1% 5.3% 6.3% 4% 5.2% 
governors play very important role in Russia 15.8% 15.6% 16.1% 15.7% 14% 13.9% 14.4% 
N 1599 1600 1600 1585 1581 1601 1601 
Source: Express 2000-18, 2001-9, 2002-9, 2003-8, Kur’yer 2004-9, 2005-9, 2006-9 at 
http://sofist.socpol.ru/oprview.shtml?en=0 (February 5, 2008) respondents were asked: “In your opinion 
what role do political parties (governors) play in Russia today?”; the scale goes from 1 (“insignificant”) to 









Table 2-4 Professional Backgrounds of United Russia First Secretaries in 2008 
 N % 
Deputy in the national parliament 12 14.81 
Deputy in the regional assembly 35 43.21 
Employed at governor’s administration  8 9.88 
Governor 3 3.7 
Businessman 8 9.88 
other 15 18.52 
Total 81 100 




Table 2-5 Distribution of Cars and Party Funds between Moscow and Regions 
(in thousands of real dollars) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
total expenditures by the central office  40,073.60 31,379.12 31,649.84 38,801.48 
Transfers to regional offices   13,110.20 14,524.40 17,558.76 22,209.92 
 (% of total) 32.72 46.29 55.48 57.24 
number of regional offices without a car -- 30 30 32 
number of cars owned by Moscow office -- 14 16 18 
average car value for Moscow -- 47.456 43.38 32.636 
average car value for cars outside of  Moscow -- 4.96 5.76 6.02 
Source: Central Election Commission, Aggregate Financial Report at http://www.cikrf.ru/elect_duma/ 























Table 2-6   Estimated Probit Coefficients for Equation 2-1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Transfers per 1000 residents  -1.700* 510−×     -1.990 510−×  
 (0.932 510−× )    (1.26 510−× ) 
Cars per 1000 residents  -82.398   -88.238 
  (59.151)   (88.727) 
Years in Office   0.046*  0.049* 
   (0.025)  (0.029) 
City donor    0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
City recipient    0.007* 0.008* 
    (0.004) (0.005) 
% Vote for United Russia, 2003     0.024 
     (0.016) 
Population density     0.006 
     (0.006) 
Governor’s Age     -0.011 
     (0.017) 
Intercept 0.776*** 0.689*** 0.287 0.456*** -0.045 
 (0.150) (0.132) (0.199) (0.158) (0.967) 
N 131 131 131 131 131 
Ln-likelihood Intercept   -77.025 -77.025 -77.025 -77.025 -77.025 
Ln-likelihood var_All   -74.909 -75.731 -75.193 -74.954 -69.060 
LR-test statistic 4.230 2.59 3.66 4.14 15.93 
P-value  0.039 0.108 0.056 0.126 0.043 
Pseudo- 2R  0.026 0.017 0.024 0.027 0.103 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
dependent Variable=1 if a governor is heads the United Russia Ballot in the Duma 2007 election or 
regional elections in March 2004-07.   













Notes on geography 
 All data are at the regional level, but the number of regions changed from 89 to 84 
between 2003 and 2008; so, to keep the number of observations the same throughout the 
years, I aggregated data to correspond to 2008 boarders.  
 The dependent variable, HeadedBallot, equals one if a governor was listed among 
top three candidates on the United Russia ballot in the Duma 2007 election or elections to 
regional assemblies that took place between March 2004 and March 2007. Data for 2007 
Duma election come from the official list of candidates submitted to the Central Election 
Commission. Data on the composition of regional ballots come from regional newspapers.  
 The variable Transfers is per capita allocations from the central party office to 
regional offices between 2004 and 2007. Data are reported in party annual financial 
statements submitted to the Ministry of Justice and tax authorities no later than March of 
the following year. The nice feature of those reports is that they exclude campaign 
finances, which makes data more accurate because it is not subjected to a campaign 
expenditure ceiling and, hence, parties do not have an incentive to misrepresent financial 
information.   
 The variable Cars measures the number of cars owned by the regional party office 
per 1000 residents. It comes from the same source as the variable Transfers, and, hence, 
covers the period between 2004 and 2007. 
 To convert those values in per capita terms I used data on population from 
Demograficheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii.    
  The variable YearsInOffice measures the number of years a governor has been in 
office by the day of regional or Duma election. It was constructed using on-line 
biographic dictionary, viperson.ru. 
 The variables City Donor and City Recipient measure the difference in per capita 
regional (rgnOutput) and city output (ctyOutput). They were constructed using data from 
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye Ppokazateli published by Goskomstat. The 
key caveat is that in 2005 the Goskomstat changed how those data are reported. For the 
period 2003-04, it does not differentiate between the commodities that were sold and the 
ones in inventories. Output data for 2005 and later, include only goods that were sold and 
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shipped to buyers. In spite of this discontinuity, these data can still be used as a legitimate 
construct for economic output because these two measures are highly correlated with 
each other. All data are lagged by one year to account for possible impact of election on 
overall productivity. Moscow and St. Petersburg, the two cities with regional status, were 
excluded because they are not subordinate to any region. Leningradskaya and 
Moscovskaya oblast’ do not have officially designated capital, so used Gatchina and 
Podol’sk, respectively as central cities.    
 The variable pcUnitedRussia2003 measures the percent of popular vote won by 
Untied Russia in the 2003 Duma election.  The data are available on the official website 
of the Central Election Commissions.  
 The variable popDensity measures population density in the region and comes 
from the same source as population 
 The variable Age measures governor’s age on the day of election and was 




Table 2-1A                           Descriptive Statistics, 2004-07 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev 
Headed  UR ballot 157 0.682 0.467 
Transfers 144 11463.960 17390.760 
Cars 144 0.001 0.003 
Years in office 149 7.101 5.049 
City Donor 140 26.693 45.178 
City Recipient 140 21.008 60.627 
% of votes for UR in 2003 147 39.002 11.111 
Population density 147 250.805 1340.475 
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CHAPTER 3  
SINCERE VOTERS, STRATEGIC ELITES, AND THE EFFECTS OF 





This paper offers a novel solution to the commitment problem that arises during a quid 
pro quo exchange between the incumbents and voters in clientelist regimes. This 
approach stems from the literature on political communication that focuses on the role of 
third-party endorsements of candidates. This paper develops a formal model and uses 
macro- and micro-level data from Russian legislative election to show that the cost of 
acquiring information significantly alters the effectiveness of political endorsements as 
vote mobilization tool.   
Introduction 
An outstanding question in the literature on clientelistic regimes is how the 
incumbent party solves the commitment problem.  Since the secret ballot prevents party 
leaders from directly observing voter choices at the polls, the party cannot punish the 
opportunistic behavior of those voters who do not vote for it subsequent to receiving 
tangible benefits.   Several alternative explanations have emerged that emphasize 
different deterrent mechanisms. The first one argues that the density of social networks 
among party members reduces the party member utility obtained by voting for another 
party.1 The second suggests that the anonymity of vote is frequently violated in emerging 
                                                 
1 Javier Auero, Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita (Duham, NC: 
Duke University Press); Steven Levitsky, “From Populism to Clientelism? The Transformation of Labor-
Based Party Linkages in Latin American,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds. Patrons, 
Clients, and Polices: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Democratic Competition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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democracies, and parties can detect and punish defectors.2  The third foregrounds intra-
party competition wherein lucrative state resources are award to those regional party 
bosses who mobilize voters more effectively. 3 The fourth claims that political machines 
influence voter turnout but not electoral choices.4   
All these approaches, however, are applicable to regimes with well-developed 
party-society linkages. The Peronists in Argentina, the Revolutionary Party in Mexico, 
and the Christian Democrats in Italy exemplify parties with strong societal roots which 
also serve as channels for distribution of state resources. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson note: 
“It takes complicated internal mechanisms of monitoring and control to limit the 
predatory behavior of party agents so that external clientelistic exchanges can still 
generate the resources needed to enable a party to win electoral office and to dominate 
the benefits-dispensing government executive.”5  
Students interested in politicization of state resources in Eastern Europe face a 
different environment: popular aversion to well-institutionalized parties, political apathy 
at the grass-root level, and week partisan affinities. In such an environment, conventional 
mechanisms that mitigate the commitment problem and facilitate monitoring are not 
available. This paper, therefore, turns to the literature on political communication to offer 
an alternative explanation about how the incumbent party can overcome the commitment 
problem.  In the U.S., political endorsements frequently become shortcuts that allow 
uninformed voters to make intelligent decisions even when they lack encyclopedic 
knowledge.  Since such endorsements are visible not only to the electorate but also to the 
party leaders, they can be used to overcome the monitoring problem. By allocating state 
resources to seemingly disinterested speakers, the incumbent party can attempt to 
persuade the electorate.  These endorsements, however, can fall on deaf ears if voters 
realize that they and the speaker have conflicting interests or when voters are more 
concerned with one-time material benefits than policy outcomes as it is assumed by the 
literature on voting in clientelistic regimes.  The question then becomes when and how 
                                                 
2 Susan Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from 
Argentina,” American Political Science Review 99 (2005): 315-25. 
3 Ozge Kemahlioglu, “When the Agent Becomes the Boss: The Politics of Public Employment in Argentina 
and Turkey,” Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 2006. 
4 Simeon Nichtor, “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot,” American 
Political Science Review 102 (2007): 19-31. 
5 Patrons, Clients, and Polices, p. 9. 
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political endorsements can further the incumbency advantage for the ruling party 
especially in a clientelistic regime?  
This paper answers the above question by developing a formal model and testing 
it on the basis macro- and micro-data from Russian legislative elections 1995-2007. 
Several factors make the study of Russian elections a fruitful venue to pursue. First, 
similar to other emerging democracies, Russian voters have not yet developed strong 
partisan attachments which can influence their electoral choices, and therefore they are 
more receptive to political endorsements than voters in Western European countries. 
Second, many political parties have appeared on the scene relatively recently, and party 
labels convey little information about their policy platforms. This encourages voters to 
look for alternative heuristics for deciding how to vote. Third, Russia’s unexpected 
transformation from a multi-party system to a dominant party state unaccompanied by 
electoral realignment among the electorate, offers a unique opportunity to examine the 
efficacy of political endorsements for bringing about regime change.  
The paper begins by laying out a formal model in which efficacy of political 
endorsements depends on the costs of obtaining information about party policy platforms. 
It then provides a brief history of political endorsements in Russia which stem primarily 
from regional governors as a part of their party-building efforts, followed by the 
empirical analysis of macro- and micro-data. Macro- and micro-level analyses imply that 
efficacy of elite cuing depends on voters’ access to the Internet which reduces the cost of 
gathering of information about the opposition parties which do not always receive a fair 
coverage by the state-controlled media.  Voters take cues from governors for which party 
to vote only in the regions with low internet-connectivity.    
 Although my argument is developed and tested employing data from Russia only, 
its implications extend beyond its borders because it calls belated attention to the practice 
of “intermediation” that became widespread in regimes with weakly institutionalized 
parties. 6  It consists of relying on a third party for vote mobilization via outsourcing 
                                                 
6 Nicolas van de Walle, “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism 
in Africa,” in Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patron, Clients, and Policies; David Samuels, “Gubernatorial 
Coattail Effects: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil,” in David Samuels, Ambition, 
Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Henry Hale, 




conventional party services to state-owned enterprises, regional officials, tribal chiefs, 
religious leaders, etc.  This practice reduces citizen-incumbent linkages and narrows the 
circle of actors to whom elected officials find themselves accountable and consequently 
makes incumbents less responsive to citizens’ preferences by transforming the essence of 
election from competition for voters to contestation for the support of power brokers. 
This is the first formal and large-n analysis of intermediation and the mechanisms by 
which it occurs.  
The paper also advances the emerging literature on the effect of the Internet on 
political behavior7 by shifting the attention from the consolidated to emerging 
democracies and by developing a formal model which clearly links the availability of the 
Internet and other technology that affects the costs of collecting information to voter 
behavior. The key result of the paper is that the Internet limits the effectiveness of the 
elite cuing. When masses can verify the information provided by the elites using unbiased 
and uncensored sources of information political endorsements become less effective for 
mobilizing electorate.    
Part I: Intermediation as a Solution to the Commitment Problem? 
 Studies of clientelism frequently evoke the image of local power brokers who 
mobilize segments of the electorate.  Their capacity to deliver votes stems either from 
their monopoly on scarce resources--land plots, local services, in-kind payments, and/or 
their affiliation with clearly identifiable group of constituents.  Power brokers may or 
may not seek public office for themselves but agree to mobilize voters in exchange for 
preferential treatment by the incumbent party.8 Their ability to deliver block votes 
facilitates ex post monitoring. Electoral results for localities and ethnic groups substitute 
the need to monitor individual behavior and, the smaller the level for which electoral 
results are reported the easier it is to assess accurately the mobilization effort exerted by 
                                                 
7 Caroline J. Tolbert and Ramona S. McNeal, “Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Political Participation?” 
Political Research Quarterly 56 (July 2003):175-185;  Kent Jennings and Vicky Zeitner, “Internet Use and 
Civic Engagement: A Longitudinal Study,” The Public Opinion Quarterly  67 (Autumn, 2003): 311-334.      
8 S.J.R. Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, c1990); Gerald Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1971); John Duncan Powell, “Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics,” American 
Political Science Review 64 (June 1970): 411-25.     
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the power broker.9 Such aggregate monitoring, however, does not solve the commitment 
problem because even though the party can observe the aggregate outcomes and punish 
the broker, the latter, in his turn cannot punish voters who defect because the secret ballot 
protects the anonymity of individual votes. So, how can brokers deter opportunistic 
behavior?   
The literature on political communication offers a useful starting point for 
answering this question. It suggests that elites’ ability to “educate” voters stems from 
informational asymmetries between elites and citizens over the true state of the world. 
Acquisition of information about political and economic realities is time-consuming and 
requires diverting cognitive effort from other salient issues. Voters may therefore rely on 
endorsements by third parties to compensate for gaps in their knowledge about a 
candidate or a policy initiative. Information about speakers’ policy preferences allows 
uninformed voters to make the same electoral choices as informed voters when the 
former know policy preferences of those actors who endorse candidates.10 But from 
where comes the information about speaker’s policy preferences? Speaker’s affiliation 
with a specific group becomes a useful indicator at this point.  Member of labor unions, 
sexual minorities, or party members can form their policy preferences by listening to their 
group leader. If the group leader says that a candidate or policy proposal is good for the 
entire group, then it must be also beneficial for an individual member. Thus, political 
endorsements by the group leader can provide informational shortcuts that facilitate  
intelligent decisions at the polls. The stronger a member’s attachment to the group, the 
greater the effect of the leader’s message.  
                                                 
9 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: an Introduction,” in Patron, Clients, and Policies, 
pp. 17-19; Luis Fernando Medina and Susan C. Stokes, “Monopoly and Monitoring: An Approach to 
Political Clientelism,” in Patron, Clients, and Policies, pp. 75-82. 
10 Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They 
Need to Know? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Arthur Lupia, “Shortcuts versus 
Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” American 
Political Science Review  88 (March 1994): 63-76; Donald R. Kinder, “Communication and Opinion,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 167-97; Malcolm E. Jewell and Sarah M. Morehouse, “What 
are Party Endorsements Worth?: A Study of Preprimary Gubernatorial Endorsements,” American Politics 
Research 24 (July 1996): 338-62; Ronald B. Rapoport, Walter J. Stone, Alan I. Abramowitz, “Do 
Endorsements Matter? Group Influence in the 1984 Democratic Caucuses,” American Political Science 
Review 85 (February 1991): 1993-2003; Timothy G. Hill, “Interest-ing Candidates: The Electoral Impact of 
Interest Group Endorsements,” Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State University (2003).         
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A simple model below illustrates how political endorsements by the group leader 
address the commitment problem triggered by the secret ballot. In a clientelisic regime, 
voters are assumed to choose among parties by simultaneously considering party policy 
positions and material benefits:  
  Ui(D)= -(xi-xd)2+b      (3-1) 
Where, D denotes a vote for party D; xd party policy platform; xi individual’s ideal point, 
and b material benefit offered by the incumbent party: state job, pension benefits, a bottle 
of vodka, etc.11 The material reward is assumed to be the same for all individuals and 
non-stochastic.  The commitment problem arises because individuals try to have the best 
of both worlds: take the bribe b from the incumbent party but then vote for a different 
party because its policy position is closer to the voter’s ideal point.  
Although the functional form above is a commonly used in the literature on 
voting in clientelistic regimes, it imposes assumptions of complete information about 
party policy positions and costless acquisition of information, none of which is supported 
by the empirical findings on voter behavior in the U.S. and even less likely to hold in 
emerging democracies where bewildering number of evanescent parties compete with 
each other. Acquiring information about party platforms takes away from consumption of 
leisure or other activities, hence, the time  spent researching party programs reduces 
utility from voting by e(t):   
Ui(D,t)= -(xi-xd)2+b-e(t)     (3-2) 
Where, e(t) is a real-valued function such that e(0)=0, e(t)>0 and increasing in t. The 
parameter t measures the time it took an individual to become familiar with party policy 
positions. The shape of this learning function can be specific to individual cognitive 
abilities and education. Voter’s utility maximization problem then becomes:  
 max , ,                                                                           (3-3) 
Political endorsements by a group leader can help some voters to keep t at 0 
because they reveal party policy position relative to the ideal point of the group. This 
information can be used by group members to compare party policy position with their 
                                                 
11 This specification is based on Greene (2007) and assumes that only the incumbent party can credibly 
promise bribe b. This assumption address the commitment problem of another type that the party fails to 
deliver promised material benefits after the election. The solution to this commitment problem goes beyond 
the scope of this project, see Kenneth F. Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization 
in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 47-57. 
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ideal points. If we assume that the leader always tells the truth and the voter knows it, a 
following dilemma arises. By taking the leader’s endorsement, the voter can keep t at 0. 
Yet, spending some time (t>0) on researching party policy positions, a voter might find 
the party with policy program closer to her ideal point. When will a group member take 
the leader’s suggestion and when instead will she search for another party independently?  
Proposition 1:  
A group member will vote for the party C endorsed by the leader if her ideal point xi is 
between the party platform and the group ideal point, and will search for another party 
otherwise. (See appendix A for the proof). 
Proposition 2:  
High cost votes are more likely to vote for the party endorsed by the leader. (See 
appendix A for the proof). 
 These propositions provide an important insight into how political endorsements 
by power brokers can solve the commitment problem, which arises because voters have 
complete information about all parties’ policy positions and receive b from the incumbent 
party (D) before going to the polls. So, instead of voting for D they vote for another party 
that has policy position closer to their ideal points. However, when voters face a non-zero 
cost of acquainting themselves with party policy platforms, third party endorsements can 
save some voters from undertaking a search which will not be utility improving. The 
subset of voters for which search for information about parties not endorsed by the group 
leader consists of those who identify themselves with a particular group and have policy 
preferences between those of party platforms and the ideal point of the group or face 
steep search costs. They are the ones who will vote for the party endorsed by the group 
leader regardless of the amount of material benefits provided by the incumbent party. 
Thus political endorsements can deter opportunistic behavior for some voters who 
received bribes from the party endorsed by the power broker.   
This conclusion hinges critically on the assumption that the leader provides 
accurate information about party policy positions. If voters suspect that endorsements are 
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biased because the leader received a material award from the party, political 
endorsements may not be effective.12   
Part II: Political Endorsements in Russian Legislative Elections 
Russian legislative elections present an exciting opportunity to study the effect of 
political endorsements on electoral outcomes outside the U.S. context.  Russian elections 
exhibit both clientelistic and programmatic features. Although there is a big divide 
between pro-reform and the Communist party on the issues of state regulation of 
economy, centralization, and the size of welfare state,13 Russian parties also enlist non-
party actors who have extensive clientelistic linkages with the electorate to compensate 
for inadequate party institutions. These actors can provide club goods to selected 
constituents or selectively coerce the opposition.  
Regional executives (hereafter, governors) usually function as such intermediaries. 
Governors derive vast regulatory powers from their offices and can direct them to create 
preferential regimes for a narrow circle of economic actors for their support of the 
preferred party or candidate ax ante. Governors control local media networks and can 
create information vacuum for the opposition; governors also select personnel who 
administers national elections and can manipulate electoral results ex post. As Hale 
shows, gubernatorial political machines are especially strong in rural areas in the 
country’s periphery, or in regions in which large segments of the electorate receive 
pensions and other manipulable, targetable, and salient state benefits.14 
Apart from political machines, many governors are charismatic leaders. A popular 
perception of governor as the protectors of regional interests stems from the soviet-time 
practice of negotiating with Moscow all aspects of regional economy: the share of 
regional tax revenues remitted to Moscow and the amount of federal expenditures 
returned back to the region, the quantity of scarce consumption goods allocated to the 
region by the federal planning agency, the production quotas imposed on regional 
                                                 
12 See Eric S. Dickson, “Leadership, Fellowship, and Beliefs About the World: An Experiment,” Working 
Paper, Department of Political Science, NYU (2009); Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, Democratic 
Dilemma The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).    
13 Evgeniya Popova, “Russian Electoral Politics: Before and Under Putin,” Paper Presented at the Annual 
MPSA Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 1, 2009. 
14 Henry Hale, “Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized Ethnicity, and Post-Communist 
Transition, in Kitschelt and Wilkinson, eds. Patrons, Clients, and Policies.  
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enterprises.15 During the first years of transition many governors won popular support by 
taking anti-Moscow stand and demanding a greater autonomy for the region.  
Throughout the 1990s governors remained largely independent from the national 
parties. They fought and won regional elections as independent candidates who owed 
little or nothing to Moscow for their victories.16 However, with the abolition of popular 
elections for governors in 2005, the presidential party gradually co-opted governors in its 
ranks.      
 If in the U.S. political parties frequently endorse candidates, in Russia, parties 
themselves become subjects of political endorsements which come primarily from 
governors.  The precedent for gubernatorial endorsements of political parties was set in 
1995, on the eve of the first democratic elections to the Russian Parliament, when 
President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomirdin attempted to create a 
liberal-democratic party Our Home is Russia (NDR) that could compete for votes with 
the Communist.  Although thirty-nine governors joined this party and campaigned on its 
behalf, it won only ten percent of the popular vote and began losing its popularity after 
Chernomirdin lost his bid for reappointment as Prime Minister for the second term. 
 By the 1999 parliamentary election, the need for a viable new presidential party 
became apparent because popular support toward the NDR virtually evaporated.  This 
time party-building initiative came from new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who 
personally met with governors and asked them to support the party Unity. Although 
twenty five governors endorsed it, as the campaign unfolded, they also decided to support 
candidates nominated by other parties in single member districts, thereby failing to 
generate unequivocal message regarding which party voters should support. 17  
                                                 
15 Donna Bahry, Outside Moscow: Power, Politics, and Budgetary Policy in the Soviet Republics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
16 Grigorii V. Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed (Boulder & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 67-75.  
17 Olga Shvetsova, “Resolving the Problem of Pre-election Coordination: The 1999 Parliamentary Elections 
as an Elite Presidential ‘Primary’,” in Vicki L. Hesli and William Mark Reisinger, eds., The 1999-2000 
Election in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003);  Robert 
W. Orttung, ed., The Republics and the Regions of the Russian Federation; A Guide to Politics, Policies, 
and Leaders (New York, NY: East West Institute, 2000), p. xviii. Between 1995-2007, Russian deputies 
were elected from a mixed-member system in which fifty percent of legislators were elected from single-




 This failure encouraged the Unity leaders to search for alternative vote 
mobilization strategies which emerged from seemingly innocuous provisions in the 
electoral law. The first provision allowed incumbents to run for another public office 
prior to the expiration of their terms. The second waived any penalties for parties whose 
candidates left public office before the end of their terms. These two provisions enabled 
United Russia, the successor to Unity, to nominate 28 governors as its candidates in the 
2003 elections. These governors were nominated to run on the party list even though they 
did not seek legislative seats which become evident when all of them refused to become 
deputies from their regions after the electoral results became known.  
The strategy of nominating regional officials who did not seek a federal office 
may seem an absurd practice at first, but the United Russia leaders saw in it an excellent 
opportunity to shorten the gap between the endorsement and electoral choices and also 
reach out to voters who do not follow campaign coverage. This strategy also allowed 
United Russia to recast legislative elections not in terms of policy issues but personalities. 
The local press was replete with slogans emphasizing that by voting for United Russia, 
people express their approval for their governor who heads this party ballot in the region. 
United Russia won 32 percent of the popular and used the same strategy again in 2007 
with already 64 governors running as its poster candidates.       
 Table 3-1 summarizes gubernatorial support and the percent of the popular vote 
won by the presidential party in all parliamentary elections. There is no apparent 
correlation between the number of governors who endorsed the party and the popular 
vote. Therefore, the following two sections examine if in fact political endorsements can 
affect electoral outcomes. 
Part III: Aggregate Analysis    
Cost of Collecting Information  
Several empirically testable hypotheses can be inferred from section I above. 
Proposition 2 implies that the effect of gubernatorial endorsements will be conditional on 
the cost of acquiring information about other parties. These costs can be affected by 
macro- and micro-level factors. At the aggregate level such region-level factors as 
freedom of the local media and the number of competing parties will influence the cost of 
finding the party close to voter’s ideal point. At the individual level, educational 
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attainment and, possibly, socioeconomic status will alter the cost of searching. To capture 
cross-regional differences in the cost of acquiring information, I collected data on 
Internet access, measured by the number of computers connected to the Internet per 100 
employees in 2003 and 2007.  When the media is controlled by the national or regional 
governments, the Internet can become a source of politically accurate information that 
allows voters to overcome the informational vacuum that surrounds the parties and the 
candidates not endorsed by the governor. Unfortunately, these data are available only for 
the period corresponding to the two last elections, both of which were held under the 
Putin administration. But this resource will be much more valuable to voters then after 
the federal government took over several important national TV networks, than at the 
time of the Yeltsin administration. Proposition 2 predicts that the effect of gubernatorial 
endorsements will be lower when voters have greater access to the Internet.    
Size of the Material Benefit     
Intergovernmental transfers to regions capture the size of the material award 
bestowed by the incumbent party on voters. These transfers are distributed through two 
major channels: the Fund for Financial Support of the Regions (FFSR) and the fund for 
regional development (RDF). The FFSR was created in 1994 following the 
recommendation of the World Bank team with the goal to offset the imbalance between 
expenditure needs and tax revenues in poor regions. 18 In 1994, FFSR accounted for 58 
percent of all intergovernmental aid and remained the most important instrument for 
intergovernmental transfers throughout the Yeltsin administration. Although the 
distribution was formula-based, the transfers were influenced by political factors.19 In 
2000, President Putin revised the formula to account for cross-regional difference in 
revenue rising capacity and expenditure needs but the allocation of funds remained 
politicized.20  The regional development fund (RDF) was established in 1995 to provide 
matching funds to regions eligible for FFSR grants to finance infrastructure development 
projects, but there is no clear-cut criterion for allocating this grant and decisions are made 
                                                 
18 Christine I. Wallich, Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, c1994). 
19 Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999). 
20 Vladimir Popov, “Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules versus Electoral Politics,” Comparative Economic 
Studies  46 (December 2004): 515-541.        
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on a case by case basis. At first, the RDF accounted for about 3 percent of all 
intergovernmental transfers, but after the implementation of the budgetary reform in 1999, 
its share declined to less than 1 percent.  
Model Specification 
 To test if the availability of the Internet conditions elite ability to influence the 
masses, the following model was estimated:  
pcVotegt=β0+β1 Govgt+β2GovIntrgt+β3 Intrgt+ β4Eqlzgt-1+β5Devgt-1 +θ’xgt+γg+ εgt         (3-4) 
where, g indexes region and t, year, and γg is the region effect. 
 The dependent variable pcVote equals the percent of vote won by the presidential 
party in the region. The two variables Eqlz and Dev measure per capita allocations to the 
region in fiscal equalization and infrastructure development grants. The dummy variable 
Gov indicates if a governor supported the presidential party. To capture the conditionality 
of this endorsement on the cost of collecting information about other parties, it was 
interacted with the number of computers connected to the Internet per 100 employees, 
Intr. Given low monitoring capacities of the company chief managerial officers, white 
collar employees frequently use computers at work for non-job related activities that 
range from live chatting and pornography viewing to reading news and even listening to 
the world news on-line. Therefore, availability of the Internet at work can sufficiently 
reduce the costs of collecting information about other parties that compete with the party 
endorsed by the governor by visiting their websites, reading their programs, and learning 
more about the party leaders.          
The vector of controls x includes economic factors that usually affect voters 
support for the incumbent party and might be also correlated with the amount of 
intergovernmental transfers: regional GDP per capita, tax revenues collected in the region 
a year before the election, unemployment rate, the strength of three major opposition 
parties--LDP, Agrarian, and the Communists--measured by the percent votes these parties 
won in the previous elections, and the size of urban population. All other unobserved 
time-invariant region-specific characteristics are controlled for by the vector of regional 
dummy variables.   
Table 3-2 reports estimated fixed-effects coefficients. The model was first 
estimated by including only the measures for intergovernmental transfers and the control 
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variables. The presidential party won more votes in the regions that received more fiscal 
equalization grants but not development grants. A $100 increase in fiscal equalization 
grants corresponds to 1.7 percentage point increase in vote share won by the presidential 
party. The coefficient on the regional development transfers, although is positive, but not 
statistically significant which suggests that fiscal equalization grants are more salient to 
voters because they distributed to pensioners and teachers, health care workers and other 
state employees.  
Column 2 reports the coefficient on the endorsement variable. In regions in which 
governors endorsed the presidential party, it received 6.5 percent more votes than in 
regions in which the governor did not endorse the party. To compare the magnitude of the 
endorsement variable, which is dummy, with the effect of fiscal equalization grants, it is 
useful to ask the following question: By how much does the fiscal equalization grant 
must be changed to increase the vote share won by the presidential party by 6.5 
percentage points? A back of the envelope calculation suggests that in an average region 
with 1.6 million residents, the incumbent party must increase fiscal equalization grants by 
$405 per capita more or $649.6 million more just in one region to increase vote share by 
6.5 percentage points. This suggests that gubernatorial endorsements constitute an 
important electioneering tool because they allow the presidential party to increase 
popular support while avoiding unrealistically high budgetary outlays.  
Before adding the Internet variable, which is available for 2003-2007 only, 
Column 3 reestimates the same model with the sample restricted to 2003 and 2007 
elections to make sure that any possible effects found after including the Internet variable 
are not driven by unobserved time trend. The coefficients remain the same.  
Column 4 reports the key finding of this paper: the estimated conditional effects 
of gubernatorial endorsements. The negative coefficient on the Gov*Intr variable 
suggests that voters are more likely to be influenced by gubernatorial endorsements in 
regions with low Internet connectivity because the Internet reduces the cost of acquiring 
information about other parties.  The size of the marginal effect of gubernatorial 
endorsements for different values of the Internet variable is shown in Figure 3-1. Political 
endorsements have positive effect on the votes received by the presidential party in 
regions with 8 or fewer computers connected to the Internet. For regions with 8-12 
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connections, political endorsements have no statically significant effect on votes won by 
the presidential party and have negative effect in regions with 12 or more computers per 
100 employees connected to the Internet.  
Another interesting feature of the internet variable is its positive correlation with 
the support toward the presidential party. Connecting one more computer per 100 
employees to the internet corresponds to 4.16 percent more votes cast for the presidential 
party. This variable also changes the importance of the regional GDP. When the Internet 
variable is not included, the coefficient on the regional output is positive and statistically 
significant (Column 4), yet, the coefficient on the GDP variable stops being significant 
when the Internet variable is included. One possible explanation is that the Internet 
variable captures a somewhat different type of economic development and economic 
conditions. During the 2000s, the GDP grew especially fast in oil extracting regions 
because of overall increase of prices on the world market, but the Internet variable 
captures the improvement at the firm level in other than natural-resource-rich regions. So, 
voters were more likely to support the presidential party when they experienced first-
hand improvement in technological development but not total regional output.  
Robustness of Results 
 Even though the estimates reported in Table 3-2 are based on the fixed-effects 
specification which controls for unobserved region-specific effects, it is still useful to 
check the robustness of the results to alternative specifications and to outliers. The first 
robustness check consists of the construct validity of the Internet variable. Although it is 
assumed to measure the costs of acquiring information about political parties, it can also 
measure the level of technological development in the region. Therefore the model was 
reestimated by including the control for the total number of computers in the region. If 
the Internet variable simply serves as a proxy for economic development, it should not 
have any effect on the electoral outcome after a more direct measure of development is 
included in a model. The coefficient on the Internet variable, although shrinks but 50 
percent in a new specification, remains positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient on the interaction term remains negative and significant. This implies that 
even after controlling for computerization of the production place, access to the internet 
continues to influence political behavior.  
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 The results on the Internet variable can be also caused by the unobserved time 
trend that could have affected both the extent of IT development in the region and the 
propensity of governors to endorse the presidential party and the omission of which can 
bias the coefficients on both the Internet and the endorsement variables. Specifically, the 
abolition of gubernatorial elections in 2005 could have been responsible for gubernatorial 
activism during the 2007 election when the governors tried to demonstrate their loyalty 
the president to secure reappointment in the future. Therefore, the model was reestimated 
by adding a dummy variable for 2007. The results are reported in Column 6. The changes 
in the specification affected primarily the coefficients on the Internet and the total 
number of computer variables: the former although remains positive stops being 
statistically significant, while the latter changes its sign from the positive to negative. The 
coefficients on the gubernatorial endorsement variable and on the interaction term also 
become smaller but continue to be statistically significant. Thus even after taking into the 
account both the regional and time trends the effect of the endorsement variable is still 
conditional on the availability of the Internet at the work place.      
.          Post-regression diagnostics is another useful way for checking if the results are 
driven by outliers, for example such regions as Moscow and St. Petersburg, which exhibit 
the highest level of technological development. The model in Column 4 was reestimated 
by omitting these two regions, but the results remain unchanged. In addition, after 
estimating the model in Column 4, Cook’s D statistic was computed for each region to 
capture how the omission of individual region affect overall model fit. The mean value 
for the Cook’s D ranges from 0 to 0.25, which suggests that the influence of an individual 
region on the estimates is relatively small.              
Part IV: Micro-Level Estimates of the Effects of Gubernatorial Endorsements 
 Micro-level analysis allows us to disentangle further the causal mechanisms by 
which political endorsements affect political behavior. In 1999 and 2003, right after the 
parliamentary elections, Timothy Colton and colleagues surveyed a representative sample 
of respondents about their political attitudes and factors that influenced their decision at 
the polls, including questions about gubernatorial support of a particular party and  
Internet literacy.   
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 It is useful to begin the analysis by providing some preliminary description of the 
data, The surveys were conducted in 32 randomly selected regions in 1999 and in 2003, 
and administered by a reputable polling agency. To maximize the accuracy of 
retrospective self- reported voting behavior, all interviews were completed within two 
months after the day of the parliamentary elections. In 1999, 1,922 and 1,648 in 2003 
respondents were visited at their homes and interviews lasted for about an hour. 21  
   Among numerous questions about their political beliefs and opinions, respondents 
were asked if they use the Internet at home, at work, at friends’ places, or somewhere else. 
In 1999, 3.69 percent (n=71) of all respondents said that they use the Internet. This 
percentage increased to 7.95 (n=131) in 2003. At first these numbers seem to be 
extremely low; however, they become significantly higher once computer ownership 
becomes accounted for. Ownership of personal computers has been extremely low in 
Russia: in 1999 only 4.06 percent (n=78) of the sample said that there was a computer at 
home; in 2003 this number increased threefold to 12.62 percent (n=208), but still remains 
much lower than in Western countries.  When the tabulation of the internet usage is 
constrained only to those respondents who have a computer at home, a different pattern 
emerges: 32.05 percent (n=25) in 1999 and 36.6 percent (n=75) in 2003 said that they use 
the Internet.            
   The survey also includes questions about gubernatorial support of political 
parties. Respondents were asked if the governor in their region supported any party 
during the parliamentary elections and those who answered affirmatively were 
subsequently asked to name the party. In 1999, 28.2 percent (n=542) and in 2003, 44.9 
percent (n=741) of respondents said that a governor supported a political party during the 
parliamentary elections. In 1999, only 11.55 percent (n=62) of these subsample said that 
the support was directed at Unity. In 2003, as high as 83.67 percent of the subsample (n= 
620) said that the governor supported United Russia.  Based on the answers to these 
questions four categories of respondents were created. The first consists of those who 
thought that the governor supported the presidential party; the second, who thought that 
he supported some other party; the third, those who thought that the governor did not 
                                                 
21 For more information about the dataset, see Henry E. Hale, Michael McFaul, and Timothy Colton, "Putin 
and the 'Delegative Democracy' Trap: Evidence from Russia's 2003-04 Elections," Post-Soviet Affairs 20 
(October-December 2004): 285-319. 
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support any party, and the last one comprises those who could not recall if the governor 
supported any party or could not name the party which one he supported. 
  To test how Internet literacy affects the effectiveness of gubernatorial 
endorsements the respondents were divided into two sub-samples: those who knew 
presidential party policy position relative their own (hereafter as “informed” respondents) 
and those who did not (hereafter as “uninformed” respondents).  Respondents were asked 
to locate themselves and the five major parties on the left-right scale with 0 
corresponding to the most left and 10 to the most right. In 1999, 63 percent (n=1, 210) of 
the sample and 58.7 percent (n=967) in 2003 could locate themselves and the presidential 
party on the left-right dimension. These two questions were used to construct the measure 
of ideological distance (xi-xp)2.  Since political endorsements serve as informational 
shortcuts, respondents who did not know  (xi-xp)2 should be more receptive to cuing by 
the governor.   
The following probit model was estimated:  
Pr(yig=Presidential Party|xig)=Φ(x’β)      (3-5)  
x’β=β0+β1GovPPig+ β2 GovNeutralig + β3 Intrig+β4Govig*Intrig +β5Distig 
+β6Eqlzg+β7Devg+ θ’xig + εig           
 where, i indexes a respondent; g, a region,  
The dummy variables: GovPP and GovNuetral indicate, respectively, if a voter 
thought that the governor endorsed the presidential party or neither party. Those who 
thought that the governor supported other than the presidential party comprise the 
reference category. The dummy variable Intr indicates if a respondent uses the Internet. 
The variable Dist captures the distance between respondent’s ideal point and the 
presidential party policy position on the left-right dimension.  The two aggregate-level 
indicators of intergovernmental transfers to the region-Eqlz and Dev-- are the same as in 
the macro-level analysis. They were matched to regions included in the survey using 
geographic identifiers contained in the survey. The vector of controls, x, contains a 
dummy variable for those respondents who had some college education, a measure of 
respondent’s age, wealth index measured by the ownership of automobile, washing 
machine, land phone line, and/or a summer house, and a dummy variable Urban which 
equals one for respondents in the largest city of the region.   
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 The estimated probit coefficients are reported in Table 3-3. To facilitate cross-
group comparison they were rescaled by setting the coefficient on the Internet dummy to 
1.  Although the initial model specification contained the interaction term Gov*Int for 
both 1999 and 2003, this variable was dropped for 1999 because of the extremely small 
number of observations per cell: only 3 respondents said that the governor endorsed the 
presidential party and also used the Internet. For 2003, this number was 49 for the 
“informed” sample and 19 for the “uniformed.”   
   The estimates for the 1999 sample are consistent with the proposition that the 
effect of gubernatorial endorsements will be weaker for the informed group. The 
coefficient on the GovSup dummy is indistinguishable from zero for the informed group, 
while positive and statistically significant for uninformed respondents. The pattern of 
support is somewhat different for the 2003 sample. Although none of the coefficients for 
the GovSup dummy is statistically significant, the coefficient on the interaction term 
GovIntr is negative and significant for the informed respondents but not for uninformed. 
This suggests that internet-literate respondents were not only better informed about 
United Russia policy position, but were more likely to verify gubernatorial campaign 
rhetoric and were less likely to be influenced by it.       
It is useful to compare the micro-level estimates in Table 3-3 with the aggregate 
level results in Table 3-2, Column 4. The coefficients on gubernatorial endorsement 
variable are always positive for the two specifications albeit not always statistically 
significant for the micro-level estimates. Urbanization is another variable that has 
persistently negative effect on the vote for the presidential party in both macro and micro 
level specification. Respondents who reside in large cities and regions with higher share 
of urban population are less likely to vote for the presidential party. The urban-rural 
cleavages became more prominent in 2003.     
The sign of the internet variable for micro-level estimates depends on the model 
specification.  When the probit specification contains the same right-hand-side variables 
as the fixed effects model, the coefficients on the interaction term GovIntr of the same 





Robustness of Results 
Recall bias constitutes an important concern. The survey data measure 
respondents’ subjective assessment of gubernatorial support and may not be accurate. 
Therefore, using geographic identifier contained in the survey, the objective measure of 
gubernatorial support was created and the model was reestimated. New coefficients are 
reported in Table 3-4. Interestingly, for the 1999 election, the coefficient on gubernatorial 
endorsements is negative and is not statistically significant from zero. For the 2003 
election, the coefficients have correct sign but are not distinguishable from zero. This 
suggests that subjective perception of gubernatorial support mattered more than actual 
governors’ behavior. Such disparities between the perceived and actual gubernatorial 
behavior might be partially caused by inconsistent behavior on the part of the governors 
themselves. As been noted in Part II, in 1999 many governors behaved opportunistically 
and endorsed one party in the at-large-district, while simultaneously endorsing candidates 
nominated by a different party in the SMD. In doing so, governors confused voters about 
the party they actually supported and, hence, respondents’ opinion about gubernatorial 
behavior mattered more than actual gubernatorial behavior. In 2003, the United Russia 
leaders address this problem by listing governors’ names on the top regional party list. 
Change in the mobilization strategy may account for the differences in the signs for 1999 
and 2003 estimates.    
Conclusion  
 This paper examined how voters’ access to uncensored sources of information 
limits elite’s vote mobilization efforts behind the presidential party and how political 
endorsements can mitigate the commitment problem that frequently arises when the 
incumbent party seeks to buy voter support.  The finding presented in this paper recast 
the existing consensus about the politics of quasi-democratic regimes in several respects. 
The rapidly growing literature on the sustainability and peaceful democratization of 
hegemonic regimes that stems primarily from the studies of PRI in Mexico asserts that 
three factors allow the dominant party to remain in power: 1) provision of generous 
material benefits to the regime supporters through extensive grass-root networks; 2) 
sporadic electoral fraud and coercion of opposition; 3) long history of holding public 
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office that increases the credibility of the dominant party’s campaign promises.22 But 
unlike the PRI in Mexico, Russian parties have little political history to leave behind and 
have atrophic partisan organization to rely on; therefore, this study instead uncovered 
how strategic use of political communication supplements the importance of material 
award and substitutes for previous policy-making experience and extensive grass-root 
partisan organization. Personal political reputation of regional leaders helped Russian 
party builders overcome deficiencies in organizational infrastructure and hastily put 
together party platforms and was especially valuable during the formative years of the 
dominant-party state.  
The paper also offered a novel solution to the commitment problem, endemic to 
political regimes in which the incumbent party seeks to influence electoral choices by 
providing selective incentives to clearly identified constituents. Since these benefits are 
provided before the election, they constitute sunk cost that should not affect voters’ future 
choices. This gives rise to the commitment problem in which voters who received 
material benefits in exchange for votes, still cast their ballots for another party. This 
paper has demonstrated how endorsements by power brokers coupled with their control 
of the mass media and campaign coverage of the opposition parties can deter such 
opportunistic behavior for some voters. Voters are more likely to support the opposition   
when they have access to the Internet or other uncensored sources of information they 
can provide unbiased information about other parties and candidates. 
 This paper also provided an insight into the relationship between democracy and 
technological development by showing that political machines are more likely to flourish 
in technologically backward regions where voters cannot freely access accurate 
information about all contestants for public office.  The literature on the effect of the 
Internet and democratic processes is only starting to emerge and the existing studies on 
this topic in unconsolidated democracies suggest that the Internet can facilitate 
democratic deepening by encouraging citizen-incumbent communication, increasing 
government transparency, opening outlets for communication for the opposition parties 
                                                 
22 Beatritz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kenneth F. Green, Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s 
Democratization in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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and NGOs, and at the times of social upheavals mitigating coordination problem.23 This 
paper advanced the existing literature a step further by showing that the Internet can limit 
the power of political machines because Internet –literate voters can filter more 
effectively the elite campaign rhetoric and party leaders’ personal appeals.            
 This finding has important policy implication for democratic consolidation of 
nascent democracies that depend heavily on loans from the Western donors. These loans 
frequently come with string attached, but the donors primarily focus on balanced budget, 
privatization, and free trade, while ignore other provisions that contribute to democratic 
deepening. This paper demonstrated that by encouraging economic actors to train their 
employees to use the Internet, foreign lenders, in addition to facilitating economic 
development can foster democratic practices and undermine the power of the dominant 
party. 
  
                                                 
23 David T. Hill, Krishna Sen, The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005); Peter Ferdinand, The Internet, Democracy, and Democratization (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000); Sarah Oates, Diana Marie Owen, Rachel Kay Gibson, eds., The Internet and Politics: 




Figure 3-1 Marginal Effect of Gubernatorial Endorsements on % of Votes Won by 
the Presidential Party, 2003-2007 
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Table 3-1  Gubernatorial Support of the Presidential Party, 1995-2007 
Our Home is 
Russia  Unity United Russia 
1995 1999 2003 2007 
Number of governors who supported the 
party 39 25 28 65 
Percent of popular vote won by the party 10.1 23.32 37.6 64.3 
Sources: Treisman, After the Deluge, Orttung, The Republics and Regions of Russian Federation, official 





Table 3-2     Estimated FE Coefficients 
 1995-07 1995-07 2003-07 2003-07 2003-07 2003-07 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gov=1 if endorsed   6.510*** 8.090*** 13.396*** 11.203*** 4.082* 
   (1.774) (2.446) (2.907) (3.041) (2.152) 
Inter    4.158*** 2.718*** 0.969 
    (0.543) (0.886) (0.616) 
Gov*Intr    -1.785*** -1.436*** -0.578* 
    (0.409) (0.435) (0.302) 
# of computers      0.746** -0.724** 
(per 100 employees)     (0.367) (0.289) 
Equalization grants  0.017** 0.016** 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.026** 0.0.14* 
($, per capita) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
Development grants  0.007 -0.040 -0.158* -0.092 -0.085 -0.023 
($, per capita) (0.094) (0.092) (0.089) (0.067) (0.066) (0.609) 
Reg. tax revenues  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
($, per capita) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Regional GDP  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 
($, per capita) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) 
Opposition  -1.445*** -1.460*** -0.307* -0.089 -0.082 0.231** 
   (0.100) (0.098) (0.174) (0.133) (0.130) (0.092) 
Unemployment  -0.186 -0.091 -3.399*** -1.895*** -1.543*** -0.430 
 (0.157) (0.155) (0.567) (0.482) (0.503) (0.353) 
Urban pop. -1.103 -1.138 -1.196 -1.276* -1.374** -0.841** 
 (0.734) (0.715) (0.858) (0.646) (0.634) (0.424) 
Dummy for 2007      29.610**
* 
      ((3.155) 
Constant 157.578*** 157.318*** 155.521** 129.769*** 125.737*** 100.618*
** 
 (51.257) (49.922) (59.936) (45.310) (44.362) (29.495) 
Observations 316 316 158 158 158 158 
R-squared 0.499 0.508 0.120 0.240 0.282 0.520 
Note: Dependent variable= percent of votes won by the presidential party; Standard errors in parentheses; 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 






Table 3-3 Rescaled Probit Coefficients Using Respondent’s Subjective Assessment   
of Gubernatorial Support 
Informed Uninformed 
1999 2003 2003 1999 2003 2003 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gov. sup. pres 
party
0.759 0.646 5.700 1.172** 5.919 0.839 
subjective (0.948) (0.713) (5.120)   (0.516) (4.747) (0.753) 
govNeutral 0.234 0.233 1.500 -0.133 3.758 0.551 
(0.509) (0.684) (4.980)   (0.398) (4.646) (0.743) 
Dist=(xi-xp)2 -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.560*** 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.140)      
 uses internet -1.000 -1.000** 1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
(0.698) (0.499) (6.760)   (0.686) (2.798) (0.897) 
intr*GovSupPP -14.380* 1.384 
   (8.140)     (1.195) 
some college  -1.079*** -0.292 -1.900 -0.805*** -0.444 -0.118 
 (0.409) (0.421) (3.180)   (0.219) (1.990) (0.333) 
wealth 0.110 0.040 0.340 0.059 0.444 0.069 
(0.175) (0.099) (0.740)   (0.093) (0.677) (0.110) 
Age -0.017 -0.038*** -0.280*** -0.011** -0.051 -0.008 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.080)   (0.005) (0.040) (0.007) 
Eqlz grants 0.000 0.003 0.020 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.040)   (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) 
Reg dev grants -276.623*** 0.011*** 0.080*** -36.244 0.000 0.000 
(94.666) (0.003) (0.020)   (115.400) (0.010) (0.003) 
Urban  -1.027* -0.997*** -7.400*** -0.627* -3.141** -0.518** 
(0.591) (0.298) (2.280)   (0.346) (1.414) (0.231) 
Constant -0.079 2.298** 16.240** -0.478 -2.485 -0.269 
(1.041) (0.997) (7.380)   (0.434) (5.303) (0.866) 
Observations 879 569 569 676 396 396 
standard errors clustered by region in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1%; dependent variable=1 if a respondent voted for Unity or United Russia; 
1Reference category consists of  respondents who thought that the governor supported different than 
Unity or United Russia party 






Table 3-4 Estimated Probit Coefficients Using Objective Measure of Gubernatorial 
Support 
 Informed Uninformed 
 1999 1999 2003 2003 1999 2003 2003 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
gov sup pres. party -0.005 -0.011 -0.076 -0.075 0.137 0.091 0.035 
objective (0.138) (0.136) (0.146) (0.153) (0.152) (0.164) (0.174) 
dist=(xi-xp)2 -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.028***    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)    
uses internet -0.276 -0.304 -0.358* -0.356 -0.484 -0.077 -0.744* 
 (0.203) (0.217) (0.197) (0.247) (0.473) (0.277) (0.386) 
intrGov  0.208  -0.007   1.199*** 
  (0.403)  (0.356)   (0.452) 
some college  -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.104 -0.104 -0.471*** -0.019 -0.029 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.155) (0.155) (0.115) (0.196) (0.196) 
wealth 0.023 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.048 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.037) (0.037) (0.052) (0.062) (0.063) 
Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.005* -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Eqlz grants -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Reg dev grants -78.075*** -78.212*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -11.140 0.001 0.001 
 (28.032) (28.179) (0.001) (0.001) (75.155) (0.002) (0.002) 
urban -0.283* -0.284* -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.321 -0.317** -0.321** 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.109) (0.109) (0.202) (0.137) (0.138) 
Constant 0.019 0.020 1.137*** 1.137*** -0.372** 0.406 0.417 
 (0.327) (0.328) (0.269) (0.269) (0.178) (0.304) (0.310) 
Observations 898 898 569 569 700 399 399 










Before presenting formal proofs, it is useful to examine the amount of information 
available to voters at different stages of electoral campaign presented in Figure A1. At 
stage 1, voter I assumed to know only his own and group leader ideal points. At stage 2, 
as the result of the  leader’s endorsement of party C, voter learns party policy position xc, 
and, hence, can calculate the distance (xi-xc). If voter decides to invest time t>0 to gather 
the information about other party platforms he might find party K with the policy position 
xk.    
 Proof of Proposition 1 
 Consider the case when xg<xc. For an arbitrary voter i with xi there can be four 
possibilities: 
Case 1: xi  [0,xg): Leader’s endorsement of party C implies that there is no party K with a 
policy position xk such that xk  [xg-xc, xc], otherwise K would have been endorsed. But if  
 xg-xc>0 there might exist a party H such that xh  [0,xi] and xi-xh<xc-xi. So it makes sense 
to search for another party that may in fact be closer to the voter’s ideal point that the 
party endorsed by the leader. 
Case 2: xi  [xg, xc]:  Leader’s endorsement of party C implies that there is no party K 
with a policy position xk such that xk  [xg-xc, xc]. Since voter’s ideal point is in this 
interval, there is no other party K such that xk  [xg, xi] or xk  [xi, xc]. If it existed, it 
would have been endorsed otherwise.    
Case 3: xi  (xc, ∞): Since xi is to the right of xc, while xg is to the left of xc, any party K 
with xk  (xc, xi] will be closer to xi than party C. 
Case 4: xi=xc=xg: since xi=xc, there is no other party closer to xi ,  and the voter will not 
search for a different party.   
The same logic applies when  xc<xg. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
This proposition follows from the observation that the maximum gain in utility by 
searching for a party K with policy platform xk such that xi=xk equals to:  
ΔUi=(xi-xc)2-(xi-xk)2-e(t)   
         (xi-xc)2-e(t) 
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 So, the steeper is the cost function, the smaller is the improvement in utility from finding 











Appendix B  
Table 3-1B                           Summary Statistics for Table 2 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
% of votes won by the presidential party 351 35.302 22.236 
Gov=1 if governor endorsed the president. party 349 0.453 0.498 
Gov*Intr 347 2.761 4.258 
Intr= # of computers with internet connection (per 100 employees) 176 6.233 4.398 
Equalization grants ($, per capita) 351 114.605 260.417 
 Development grants ($, per capita) 349 2.099 9.054 
Regional tax revenues ($, per capita)  349 371.746 1401.485 
Regional GDP ($, per capita) 316 1775.038 2351.660 
Strength of opposition parties in previous elections 349 36.240 12.106 
Unemployment rate 338 34.881 61.332 










Table 3-2B                   Summary Statistics for Table 3 
1999 2003 
informed uninformed informed uninform









Voted for Unity or UR 934 0.224 735 0.158 618 0.482 440 0.541
(0.417) (0.365) (0.500) (0.499)
Gov. sup. pres party 957 0.041 763 0.024 889 0.474 740 0.269
subjective (0.198) (0.152 ) (0.500) (0.444)
 Gov did not sup any 942 0.334 750 0.217 891 0.153 743 0.162
 (0.472) (0.413) (0.360) (0.368)
Doesn’t know if gov sup 957 0.307 763 0.571 889 0.331 740 0.545
any party (0.462) (0.495 ) (0.471) (0.498)
 Uses internet 952 0.051 768 0.020 892 0.091 756 0.066
 (0.221) (0.138 ) (0.287) (0.249)
Gov*Intr 949 0.002 760 0.001 889 0.052 740 0.026
 (0.046) (0.036 ) (0.222) (0.158)
 Has a computer 953 0.056 769 0.022 886 0.142 752 0.109
 (0.229) (0.147 ) (0.349) (0.312)
Dist=(xi-xp)2 960 15.197 892 10.550 0
 (24.018) (19.096) 
Education =1 if some  960 0.550 771 0.691 891 0.324 756 0.192
college (0.498) (0.462 ) (0.468) (0.394)
Wealth 948 1.379 766 0.984 884 6.399 747 6.695
 (1.125) (1.076 ) (1.213) (1.149)
Age 959 46.346 769 52.187 814 48.393 682 50.249
 (16.333) (17.989 ) (16.565) (18.604)
Eqalilzation grants 959 10.560 771 13.438 892 31.902 760 36.978
 (27.382) (35.110 ) (38.537) (59.820)
Reg dev grants 941 0.001 743 0.000 892 5.120 760 2.027
 (0.001) (0.001 ) (21.322) (11.915)
Urban   960 0.473 771 0.428 892 0.454 756 0.405
(0.500) (0.495 ) (0.498) (0.491)
trueUnity 959 0.244 771 0.147 892 0.369 770 0.358
(0.430) (0.354 ) (0.483) (0.480)
intrGov 951 0.007 768 0.001 892 0.037 756 0.033
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CHAPTER 4  
PRE-ELECTORAL COALITIONS AND POST-ELECTORAL CENTER-
PERIFERY BARGAINING IN RUSSIA, 1999-2005  
 
 
Abstract:     
This paper examines how informal pre-electoral coalitions between national legislators 
and regional governors affected the development of Russian federalism. Between 2000 
and 2005, Russia witnessed rapid recentralization of power that subsequently led to the 
abolition of popular elections for governors. This paper examines the incremental process 
that resulted in this outcome and explains why legislators supported presidential 
intervention in regional affairs. Using roll call data on a bill that paved the way to the 
suspension of gubernatorial elections, the paper shows that legislators supported federal 
encroachment when it benefited regional governors because the former depended on the 
latter for their own political survival.   
Introduction  
Opportunistic behavior is endemic to all federations.  The costs of compliance 
with federal rules accrue unevenly to member states, prompting some of them to shirk 
from contributing to the collective good and to shift the burden onto other federation 
members. Similarly, the national government may circumvent the constitution when the 
expansion of powers becomes politically expedient.  This paper examines such 
opportunistic behavior in the Russian Federation between 1999-2005. Although 
throughout the 1990s the balance of power was clearly tilted toward the periphery, in the 
early 2000s the pendulum of power shifted back toward the center in such a manner that 
Russia began resembling a unitary state with federal trappings rather than a genuine 
federal republic. The center deprived the states of independent tax instruments, abolished 
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popular elections for governors, and consolidated the control of administrative personnel 
in presidential hands.1  
President Vladimir Putin, who orchestrated this dramatic transformation, did not 
act unilaterally. Although he had the power of decree, he never invoked it to recentralize 
the state. Instead, he built the “vertical power” abiding by the confines of existing 
institutions and mustering legislative majorities behind his institutional reforms. This 
strategy gave the reforms the appearance of legitimacy and popular backing given that 
the majority of national legislators voted for them.  This paper, therefore, focuses on 
micro-level processes and examines legislators’ voting records on bills that led to this 
transformation.  
Not all of Putin’s recentralization measures were unlawful transgressions, most of 
them falling into gray areas. Upward shift of taxing powers, introduction of a system of 
federal envoys, and even a reform of the upper chamber shifted authority upward without 
violating the Constitution, while others, such as the abolition of gubernatorial elections, 
dissolution of regional assemblies, and the reform of regional electoral system, 
constituted a gross violation of the federal principle. These violations constitute the focus 
of this paper. Since all these measures received the majority of votes in the lower 
chamber, the Duma, this prompts the following question:  Why did popularly elected 
legislators vote for measures that violated the constitution?  
This paper reveals that federal encroachment upon regional powers became 
possible because national legislators lacked independence from governor and supported 
federal regulation of regional elections when it allowed incumbent governors to prolong 
their stay in office.  The analysis that leads to this conclusion consists of three parts. Part 
I reviews the literature on authority migration and shows that the question of political 
recentralization, which constitutes the focus of this paper, has to date been inadequately 
studied. Part II provides a brief overview of Moscow’s interference in regional elections 
beginning with sporadic changes in election dates made by President Boris Yeltsin, 
changes which culminated in the abolition of popular elections for governors during the 
                                                 
1 Vladimir Gel’man, “Leviathan’s Return: The Policy of Recentralization in Contemporary Russia,” in 
Cameron Ross ed., Federalism and Local Politics in Russia (New York: Routledge, 2009); Cameron Ross, 
“Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back!” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (March 2003): 29-47.   
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second term of Putin’s administration. Part III develops a simple formal model that links 
authority migration to electoral considerations and tests it by employing roll call data.   
Part I: Authority Migration in a Federation 
 Over the past decade the number of studies explaining authority migration 
between the center and periphery rapidly expanded (Table 4-1) from which two schools 
of thought emerged. The first views (de)centralization as a process of policy-making with 
a clear starting and ending point. The second considers authority migration as an 
institution-building process that causes the problem of compliance with legal norms.  The 
policy-making paradigm views federal statutes as the ultimate source of power 
distribution and thus focuses attention entirely on the legislative branch. It argues that 
legislators’ preferences are all that matters for changing center-periphery relations.  These 
preferences are shaped by electoral considerations, while legislators’ ability to translate 
preferences into policy outcomes depends on the distribution of resources between the 
center and the periphery. Therefore, the extent of decentralization reflects the preferences 
of legislators who can support either national or subnational governments. Legislators’ 
preferences for decentralization depend on the probability of success in upcoming 
national elections, partisan ideology, and personal ties to home districts.2  
Path dependency plays an important role in this explanation because 
intergovernmental reforms create transitional losers and winners who may find it 
advantageous to support only partial decentralization. As Falleti shows, decentralization 
is a multi-dimensional concept entailing the devolution of political, fiscal, and 
administrative authority to subnational government. Governors and presidents prefer 
different sequencing of reforms, with governors advocating political decentralization 
before fiscal and administrative one. Such sequencing brings about more profound 
decentralization because the introduction of popular elections at subnational level 
increases governors’ independence from the President.  Then, more autonomous 
governors build coalitions and subsequently demand greater fiscal and administrative 
autonomy. The President, to the contrary, prefers minimal decentralization through 
devolution of administrative authority unaccompanied by fiscal or political reforms. 
                                                 
2 Rodrigo Mardones  Z., “The Congressional Politics of Decentralization: The Case of Chile,” Comparative 
Political Studies 40 (March 2007): 333-358; Kathleen O’Neill,“Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy,” 
Comparative Political Studies 36 (November 2003): 1068-1091. 
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When the President prevails, reforms result only in partial decentralization, and the 
transfer of administrative autonomy becomes equivalent to unfunded mandates that 
undermine the quality of service provision and trigger popular opposition to further 
decentralization.3        
Political parties play a precarious role in decentralization literature. In the long-
run, parties adapt to the distribution of power, but in the short run political parties are 
assumed to shape legislators’ preferences for decentralization.4 The argument that parties 
can buttress federal arrangements was first advanced by Riker who emphasized two 
elements of the party system: party discipline and consolidation of the control over 
national and subnational governments by a single party.5 Party discipline reduces the 
centrifugal tendency because national leaders can effectively block measures advocating 
devolution of power, while regional actors’ control over selection and nomination of 
candidates to national office reduces centripetal tendencies by making national legislators 
more sensitive to regional demands. Yet, empirical tests of this proposition have led to 
ambiguous results. The hypothesis was confirmed for Latin America but rejected for 
Spain and Australia where national leaders’ tight control over partisan organizations 
failed to prevent asymmetric decentralization.6      
The institutionalist camp questions the fundamental premise of the policy-making 
paradigm that the legislative branch is the foci of authority migration because both states 
and federal government can subvert decentralization de facto. If the policy-making camp 
seeks to understand why federal statutes are enacted, institutionalists seek to explain how 
statutes and constitutions are sustained. The challenges to sustaining federal 
                                                 
3 Tulia G. Falleti, “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative 
Perspective,” American Political Science Review 99 (August 2005): 327-246. 
4 For the effects of decentralization on the structure of party system see Pradeep Chhibber & Ken Kollman, 
The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, 
India, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
5 William H. Riker, The Development of American Federalism (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1987), p. 74; and  more recently Larry D. Kramer, “Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism,” Columbia Law Review 100 (January 2000):215–293.  
6 Christopher Garman, Stephan Haggard, Eliza Willis, “Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with 
Latin American Cases,” World Politics 53 (January 2001): 205-236;  Jorge P. Gordin, “Testing Riker’s 
Party Based Theory of Federalism: The Argentine Case,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 34 (Winter 
2004):21-34; Campbell Sharman, “Discipline and Disharmony: Party and the Operation of the Australian 
Federalism,” in Campbell Sharman, ed., Parties and Federalism in Australia and Canada (Canberra: 
Federalism Research Center, Australian National University, 1994), Alfred P. Montero, “The Politics of 
Decentralization in a Centralized Party System: The Case of Democratic Spain,” Comparative Politics 38 
(October 2005): 63-82.   
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arrangements are similar to maintaining all other institutions. Unless the agreements are 
self-enforcing, rational actors will not abide by them and a third party will be required to 
punish defections. Reliance on a third party tends to trigger monitoring imperfections. 
The institutionalists literature, therefore, either focused on conditions that make federal 
arrangements self-enforcing while or examined factors that mitigate defections in the 
presence of monitoring imperfections. The former focused on the commitment problem 
that is especially acute in the area of fiscal federalism. For example, Diaz-Cayeros argues 
that fiscal centralization requires states to give up taxing powers in exchange for 
budgetary transfers from the national government. Ex ante the federal government always 
promises to compensate the regions for the loss of own tax revenues through budgetary 
transfers, Yet, the centre is unlikely to keep its promise ex post. Diaz-Cameron shows 
that subnational actors will transfer fiscal authority upward only if the center agrees to 
use its power to shield regional politicians from electoral competition. Diaz-Cameron 
relies on in-depth case studies of centralization in Mexico to illustrate how the formation 
of the hegemonic party regime facilitated fiscal centralization after the World War II.  
The Revolutionary Party’s hegemonic position coupled with a peculiar structure of term 
limits for the president and governors facilitated gubernatorial access to public office and 
made fiscal centralization feasible.7  
The commitment problem does not always harmful to subnational officials, and 
Rodden examines a situation when the federal government cannot credibly commit to 
punish the regions to deter opportunistic behavior. He focuses on federal bailouts to 
rescue fiscally irresponsible subnational governments. Using data for the United States 
and Switzerland, Rodden shows that financial markets mitigate the commitment problem 
by increasing the costs of borrowing for the national government subsequent the bailing 
out of the regions.8     
Bednar, instead, begins from the assumption that defections are endemic to all 
federations and goes on to develop a theory of institutional, political, and judicial 
safeguards. She argues that these safeguards must simultaneously address three types of 
                                                 
7 Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
8 Jonathan A. Rodden, Hamilton’s The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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opportunism: 1) federal encroachment; 2) states’ shirking form contributing to collective 
goods; 3) burden shifting on other states the responsibility to take care of high-cost 
citizens. Safeguards must be “complete” and “redundant.”  Completeness entails 
addressing all three types of opportunistic behavior, while redundancy guarantees that 
malfunctioning of one safeguard will be recompensed by another.9       
 Despite these advances, several theoretical gaps remain. First, the literature on 
authority migration has focused predominantly on fiscal federalism while ignoring 
political decentralization that is harder to quantify and analyze. Unlike fiscal 
decentralization, political decentralization modifies a political regime and, thus, becomes 
intertwined with the process of democratization.  Such a dual transition complicates 
analysis by muddling boundaries between the winners and losers of reforms and 
producing new cleavages that do not fall neatly along center-periphery divide. Thus, the 
set of actors pushing for political decentralization may not necessarily coincide with the 
set of actors who support fiscal or administrative reforms. Second, the center versus 
periphery approach assumes what needs to be explained. Following Riker, the 
distribution of power in the federation has been analyzed through the lenses of states 
versus center bargaining, an assumption implying that regional identity is more dominant 
than ethnicity or socio-economic status, which naturally begs the question of why and 
when geographic cleavages become more salient than others. This question becomes 
especially relevant in attempts to explain legislators’ voting records. It is not uncommon 
for legislators to wear multiple hats at once: they are party members, regional 
representatives, members of socio-economic groups, and corporate lobbyists. Thus, 
legislators frequently find themselves serving multiple principals at once and they do not 
always place regional interests above the demands imposed by other groups. In particular, 
Jones and Hwang find no evidence of regional clustering of votes among Argentinean 
legislators while Desposato shows that regional influence is extremely small in Brazil.10  
These findings suggest that center-periphery cleavages are not always salient and that 
                                                 
9 Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
10 Mark P. Jones and Wonjae Hwang, “Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel 
Theory beyond the U.S. Congress,” American Journal of Political Science 49 (April 2005): 267-282; Scott 
Desposato, “The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29  
(May 2004): 259-285. 
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more time needs to be spent theorizing exactly what propels the saliency of geographic 
cleavages.  
This paper advances an explanation that addresses some of these gaps. The 
explanation begins with the assumption that national legislators seek the support of 
several actors at once-- parties, voters, governors, and the president—and in so doing 
moves away from the billiard-ball perception of center-periphery relations. Legislators’ 
vote share depends on policy outcomes and organizational resources at their disposal. 
Their ability to bring policy closer to their median voter’s ideal point depends on the 
distribution of powers between the center and periphery. When the national government 
enacts policies opposed by the regional median voter, governors in those regions have a 
strong incentive to undo de facto the effect of federal policy by refusing to implement it 
or to demand de jure devolution of authority. Likewise, when regions fail to enact 
policies beneficial to the national median voter, the national government may reclaim the 
policy making authority.  Electioneering motivations create a strong incentive to stretch, 
distort, and subvert the federal constitution so as to realize immediate short-term gains, 
but they can also serve as a deterrent.  Legislators’ opportunistic behavior may trigger 
retaliation by governors and party leaders who can withdraw their organizational 
resources. The probability of punishment depends on the saliency of policy issue for the 
two other actors, while the effectiveness of punishment is correlated by the extent that 
organizational resources are shared among legislators and governors.  Several 
institutional features affect the extent to which organizational resources are shared among 
politicians at different levels of government. Concurrent timing of presidential, legislative, 
and gubernatorial elections is one such instance because presidents and governors are 
capable of generating coattails for legislators running on the same ticket. Vertically 
integrated parties is another example. Vertical integration is characterized by 
interdependence between national and local organizations which introduces spillover 
effects between national and regional elections.11  
Legislator’s payoffs from altering federal arrangements depend on the state of the 
 
                                                 
11 Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-
Sustainable Federal Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 6. 
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world are given by the following matrix:  
State of the world PG ~PG P~G ~P~G 
Probability cpcg (1-cp)cg cp(1-cg) (1-cp)(1-cg) 
Actions:     
Abide 0 0 0 0 
Transgress x-zp-zg x-zg x-zp x 
 
Where,  
P indicates that party leaders (or the president) care about the policy and wants to 
preserve federal authority over this policy area 
~P indicates otherwise 
G indicates that the governor cares about the policy, ~G is otherwise 
cp<1 is the probability that party leaders (the president) care,  
cg<1 is the probability that governor cares, 
x is the expected increment in vote for the legislator as a result of transgressing the 
constitution and bringing policy outcome closer to the preferences of the median voter in 
his region 
zp is the expected decrement in votes as the result of president’s withdrawal of his 
organizational resources  
zg is the expected decrement in votes as a result of legislator’s withdrawal of his 
organizational resources  
The expected change in the vote share from abiding the constitution is 0, while 
from transgressing:  
         E(ΔV)=cpcg(x-zp-zg)+(1-cp)cg(x-zg)+cP(1-cg)(x-zp)+(1-cp)(1-cg)x=x-cgzg-cpzp         (4-1) 
Equation (4-1) implies that legislators compare costs and benefits of transgressing 
the constitution and encroach on regional powers only when electoral benefits exceed 
costs. The same logic can be applied to the president’s and governors’ decision making. 
The following two sections apply this analysis to explain Moscow’s encroachment on 





Part II: History of Federal Intervention in Russia 
Electoral federalism constitutes the most controversial aspect of Putin’s reforms. 
The term “electoral federalism” was coined by Russia’s legal experts to describe the 
division of power to regulate elections at the national and subnational levels.12 Though 
Article 77 of the Russian constitution grants regions the autonomy to organize their 
governments, the federal government has frequently violated this provision. The 
precedent for this intervention was set a year after ratification of the constitution when in 
October 1994 President Yeltsin issued the decree that postponed the introduction of 
popular elections for governors in selected regions, to prevent the communists from 
winning in those elections. Dominated by the KPRF Duma immediately challenged the 
constitutionality of the decree by filing a case with the Constitutional Court. The Court, 
however, upheld the decree as a provisional measure seeking to fill in the legal lacuna 
created by delays in enacting regional and federal electoral laws. Thus, the Court ruled 
that the decree would be effective only until the adaptation of federal and regional 
electoral laws. The Court decision was not unanimous, and in a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Luchina, argued that the decree violated the constitutional right of regions to form 
their own governments.13 As a result of the court decision, presidential intervention in 
altering the timing of gubernatorial and legislative elections in selected regions continued 
till 1996.    
The Law on Regional Governments (LRG) of 1999 marked a new stage of center-
periphery relations (Table 4-2). The law stipulated that regions had the right to set the 
dates of elections for regional assemblies but also established term limits for regional 
governors. Seemed innocuous at first, this provision nevertheless had important 
constitutional ramifications. Upholding Yeltsin’s intervention in gubernatorial elections 
in 1994, the Constitutional Court ruled that this intervention was provisional. The LRG 
permanently placed the right to micro-manage regional elections in federal hands. 14 
                                                 
12 S.D. Knyazev, “Rossiyskiy Elektoral’niy Federalizm: Konstitutsionno-Pravovoye Soderzhaniye I 
Problemy Razvitiya,” Gosudarstvo i Pravo (January 2008): 23-29. 
13 M.A. Sakhle, “Vzaimootnosheniya Presidenta Rossii s Sub’yectamy RF v Sfere Formirovaniya Organov 
Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti Subyektov Federatsii,” Gosudarstvo i Pravo (March 2008): 104-109, p. 107. 
14 Federalniy Zakon N184-F3, “Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Zakonodatelnikh (Predstavitelnikh) 
i Ispolnitelnikh Organov Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti Subyektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” (October 6, 1999). 
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Realizing the long-term implications of the term limit provision, the Federation 
Council (the upper chamber consisting of governors and heads of regional assemblies) 
introduced an amendment to return to the regions the power to regulate gubernatorial 
term limits. On October 18, 2000 the Council’s Chairman Nikolay Fedorov gave a speech 
in the Duma denouncing the provision as unconstitutional and urging deputies to repeal it. 
Yet, after several hours of heated debates Federov’s proposal was defeated by 304 to 19 
votes.15  
Newly elected President Putin, however, viewed this provision as an opportunity 
to reward governors who supported him in the 2000 presidential elections by allowing 
them to seek reelection for the third term. This goal was achieved by introducing a 
grandfather clause that made term limits imposed by the LRG effective only after the 
expiration of the term during which it was enacted.  The amendment swiftly passed the 
Duma and the Federation Council and was signed into law on February 8, 2001, just in 
time to allow Mintimer Shaimiev, the President of the Tatar Republic and Putin’s key 
supporter, to get elected for the third term.16 Sixty-eight other governors who were about 
to be forced out of office due to term limits received the right to run for a third term.  
This amendment, however, introduced confusion in the administration of regional 
elections because officials in Moscow and in the regions applied dual standards to count 
the number of terms. Regional election commissions used regional statutes while the 
Central Election Commission relied on the federal law. The most politicized controversy 
arose around elections in the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic, whose incumbent President 
Nikolayev was elected in December 1991 and then reelected in December 1996. In 
September 2001, he decided to seek a third term and was registered by Yakutia’s Election 
Commission as one of the candidates. His opponents then filed a lawsuit with 
Yuakutiya’s Supreme Court (YSC) claiming that he violated the term limits set by Article 
67 of Yakutiya’s Constitution.  In its turn, the YSC asked the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation to consider the constitutionality of article 67. The latter ruled that it 
contradicted the federal statutes and upheld Nikolayev’s right to run for the third term. 
                                                 
15 Gosudarstvennaya Duma, Stenogramma Zasedaniy (October 18, 2000). 
16 Federalniy Zakon  N3-F3, “O Vnesenii Dopolnenniya v Federalniy Zakon ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh 
Organizatsii Zakonodatelnikh (Predstavitelnikh) i Ispolnitelnikh Organov Gosudarstvennoy Vlasti 
Subyektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” (February 8, 2001).  
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However, the YSC failed to find this judgment convincing and appealed to the 
Constitutional Court which dismissed the case, and in so doing failed to clarify the letter 
of the law. 17        
 Seeking to correct this “mistake,” the Duma moved to restore the regions’ right 
to regulate limits, but in vain. Although the majority of deputies voted for it, the measure 
was vetoed by the Federation Council. The Duma’s attempt to override the Council veto 
next failed.  Three hundred votes were required for the override, whereas only 285 
deputies voted “yea.”  Attempting to rescue the bill, its supporters asked deputies to cast 
ballots one more time, but this time using roll call rather than the secret ballot.  The 
number of deputies who openly voted for the restoration of term limits then dropped to 
246, and the federal right to regulate regional term limits was sustained.18 For many 
deputies, taking a stand against the governor, even to uphold the constitutional right of a 
region to form its own government, was a move too politically costly to make.  
This failure to restore the balance of power between the center and periphery had 
long- term implications. In June 2002 the President pushed through the Duma a Law on 
Elections and Participation in Referenda, which monopolized in federal hands the right to 
regulate elections at all levels. The abolition of gubernatorial elections in December 2004 
became the final blow for Russian federalism.  
Both Yeltsin and Putin altered the timing of gubernatorial elections to further their 
political ambitions. Both considered backing by governors crucial to their own reelection 
and thus sought to reduce uncertainty in regional elections on the eve of presidential 
elections. Governors welcomed such an interference because it served to prolong their 
stay in office. Enactment of the grandfather clause allowed 68 governors to seek third 
terms, while the abolition of gubernatorial elections allowed 12 governors to stay in 
office for a fifth term.19  As Goode points out, the abolition of gubernatorial elections was 
                                                 
17 Ilya Sokov, Verkhovniy Sud Obespechil Preemstvennost’ Vlasti v Yakutii,” Novye Izvestiya (September 
27, 2001); Veniamin Rogachev, “Dvazhdy po Russki,” Noviye Izvestiya (November 3, 2001); “Verkhovniy 
Sud Yakutii Imel Pravo I Byl Obyazan Obratit’sya v Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossii,” Yakutiya (November 
27, 2001); Konstitutsionnyi Sud, “Ob Otkaze v Prinyatii k Rasssmotreniyu Zaprosa Verkhovnogo Suda 
Respubliki Sakha (Yakutiya) o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Chasti Vtoroy Stat’I 67 Konstitutsii Respubliki 
Sakha (Yakutiya),” (OKS-No. 216, December 7, 2001) . 
18 Gosudarstevennaya Duma, Stenogramma Zasedaniy (November 18, 2001). 
19 “Rossiysikie Gubernatory Idut na Patiy Srok,” Regnum News (July 5, 2007) at http://www.regnum. 
ru/news/838955.html (accessed on June 24, 2009). 
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Putin’s response to his earlier efforts to unseat disloyal governors in natural-resource-rich 
regions. In most regions, however, Kremlin candidates lost to local oligarchs.20       
Although Yeltsin and Putin shared similar electoral goals, they chose different 
legal instruments for achieving them. Yeltsin relied on presidential decrees; Putin, on 
federal statutes. Putin’s success in pushing all his measures through the Duma prompts 
the following question: Why did legislators support measures that infringed upon their 
constituents’ powers to form regional governments?  The peoples of the Russian regions 
imposed term limits precisely to prevent the rise of authoritarian regimes ruled for 
decades by the same individual, Nevertheless, popularly elected legislators sided with the 
President and subverted term limits by allowing federal regulation of regional affairs. The 
following section examines the factors that led to such an outcome. 
Part III:  Empirical Analysis of Roll Calls 
 The simple model presented in Part I explains encroachment by electoral 
incentives and availability of organizational resources. Partisan organizations usually 
provide such resources, but in Russia, parties were still weakly institutionalized in the 
early 2000s. Most were based in Moscow, lacked regional partisan organizations, and 
relied primarily on national TV networks to mobilize the electorate.21 Even when national 
parties formed regional branches they continued to ignore regional elections.22 Weakly 
institutionalized parties facilitated the entrance of other actors who could provide vote 
mobilization services more effectively than fragmented partisan organizations. Regional 
governors emerged as one of such actors, whose direct involvement in Duma elections 
rendered legislators dependent on gubernatorial political resources.23 This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
H1: Legislators elected with gubernatorial help would be more likely to support federal 
intervention aimed at extending gubernatorial term limits. 
                                                 
20 J. Paul Goode, “The Puzzle of Putin’s Gubernatorial Appointments,” Europe-Asia Studies 59 (May 
2007):365-99. 
21 Sarah Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia (London: Routledge, 2006). 
22 Grigorii V. Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed (Boulder, Co.: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Derek S Hutcheson, Political Parties in the Russian Regions (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
23 Henry E. Hale, Why not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. 
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 The extension of term limits stood at odds with the promotion of democratization 
in the regions. Thus, if the assumption about policy-considerations is correct, then 
legislators should  also consider the effects of their vote on regional political situation and 
vote against the expansion of term limits when it threatens regional democratization. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Legislators representing regions with low levels of democratization will be less likely 
to vote for the extension of term limits. 
  Saliency of term limits for the incumbent governor could have also affected the 
legislators’ votes. Not all governors benefited equally from term-limit expansion, only 
those who were served their second terms in the regions that had two term-limit 
provisions, received tangible benefits after the passage of the federal amendment.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis might hold:  
H3: Legislators would more likely to support the expansion of term limits when the 
incumbent governor would otherwise be ineligible for reelection.        
Model Specification and Data 
 To test the above hypotheses the following probit model was estimated:  
Pr(Yij=1|x)=Φ(β’xij) 
            β’xij=β0+β1GovSupij+β2 Democij + β3LastTermij +z’θ+εij 
where, i indexes legislator and j, region,  
Dependent Variable  
Due to the limited availability of roll call records, the empirical analysis herein is 
restricted to the legislative vote on the amendment that sought to restore regional right to 
regulate gubernatorial term limits. If this amendment had been enacted, regional term 
limits would again have become binding. The dependent variable equals 1 if a legislator 
voted for the amendment and 0 if a legislator voted against or did not vote at all. About 
100 legislators refused to vote on this measure, and these missing votes were treated as 
votes against the bill because two-thirds of all 450 deputies was required to override the 
veto. 
Independent Variables 
The variable GovSup equals 1 if the governor supported ether the legislator or the 
party during the 1999 Duma election. It was constructed using Hale’s and Orttung’s 
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data.24 Legislators were elected from a mixed-member system, and it was not uncommon 
for governors to support legislators affiliated with one party in the SMDs and while 
endorsing a different party in the at-large district. Out of 225 elected from the SMDs, 117 
were supported by the governor; only 55 legislators elected on the party lists were 
supported by the governor.  
The variable Democ captures democratization in the region for 1991-2001. It is an 
expert rating of regional democratization constructed using ten indicators: 1) the 
openness of political life; 2) gubernatorial reliance on administrative resources to 
suppress the opposition; 3) the extent of political pluralism; 4) the degree of media 
freedom; 5) the extent of privatization; 6) the strength of civil society; 7) judicial 
independence; 8) turnover in local elites; 9) corruption level; and 10) the extent of local 
autonomy. Each region was assigned a value from 1 to 5 on each indicator with 5 
indicating the highest level of democratization and 1 the lowest.25 This measure captures 
regional political conditions up to the year when the question of term limits was decided.   
 The variable LastTerm equals 1 for regions in which incumbent governors were 
serving their second term in November 2001 and under the regional statutes were 
ineligible for reelection. This measure was constructed using regional charters and data 
on the outcomes of gubernatorial elections.26 In November 2001, 61 of the incumbent 
governors were finishing their second term and only 23 of them were eligible for 
reelection because regional statutes did not contain term limits.     
A vector z comprises several control variables. The first control variable is 
legislator’s regional affiliation. Mordones examines legislative voting record on 
decentralization measures in Chile and finds that legislators born and educated in 
Santiago were less likely to support decentralization than those elected from other 
                                                 
24 Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia?, available at http://hehale5.googlepages.com/whynotpartiesinrussia? 
(May 2009); Robert W. Orttung, Danielle N. Lussier, and Anna Paretskaya, eds. The Republics and 
Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, c2000), Introduction.  
25 Nikolay Petrov, “Regional Models of Democratic Development,” in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, 
and Andrey Ryabov, eds., Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political 
Reform (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).    
26 Nikolay Petrov and Aleksey Titkov, “Vybory Glav Ispolnitel’noy Vlasty Regionov,” in G. 
Lukhterkhandt-Mikhaleva and S. Rizhenkov, eds., Vybory i Partii v Regionakh Rossii (St. Petersburg: 
Letniy Sad, 2000), pp.75-79. 
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regions.27 Therefore, a dummy variable, Moscow, was included for legislator from the 
country’s capital.  Another dummy variable, Republic, controls for differences in regional 
administrative status. Throughout the 1990s, republic leaders pushed for greater 
independence from Moscow more aggressively than their counterparts in oblasts, and this 
difference may be also observed in the voting records of legislators.  A dummy for the 
Unity party accounts for inter-party differences in support of term limits. Because the 
proposal to expand term limits came from the President, legislators affiliated with Unity 
may have been less supportive of the measure that sought to repeal it.  The dummy 
variable for legislators elected form SMDs is another control. These legislators might 
have been more independent from the party leaders but more sensitive to gubernatorial 
preferences. The variable Unempl captures  cross-regional differences in economic 
conditions that may also affect legislators’ willingness to grant the incumbent governor in 
their region a third term.  It equals the difference between the regional and national 
unemployment rate in 2001.  
Results 
Table 4-3 reports the estimated marginal effects of one unit change in the 
dependent variable on the probability that a legislator votes to restore regional term limits. 
It is easy to compare the relative effects of each variable because most o them are 
dummies. Partisan affiliation turns out to be the most important factor affecting 
legislative vote. Unity members were 53 percent less likely than other parties to support 
the restoration of regional term limits. This finding is not surprising given that Unity was 
dominated by Putin’s backers and this amendment did not square well with Putin’s 
attempt to restore “vertical power.” Possession of their own electioneering resources is 
the second greatest determinant of legislators’ votes.  Those who were elected with 
gubernatorial help were 19 percent less likely to vote for restoring regional term limits. 
This result is consistent with H1 predicting that legislators will adopt positions closer to 
governor preferences when they depend on gubernatorial organization resources.  
The two remaining hypotheses are not supported by the data. The estimated 
coefficients on the Democ and LastTerm variables have wrong signs. The positive and 
                                                 
27 Rodrigo Mordones Z., “The Congressional Politics of Decentralization: The Case of Chile,” Comparative 
Political Studies 40 (March 2007): 333-358. 
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significant coefficient on the LastTerm variable suggests that legislators were not 
completely indifferent to the political situation in their region and were willing to restore 
regional term limits to force out of the office incumbents at the end of their second term. 
This finding indicates that legislators did not completely abandon constituent interests.      
The coefficients on the Republic and Moscow dummies point to cross-regional 
differences. Legislators representing republics were less likely to support restoring 
regional term limits, while Moscow representatives were more likely to vote for this 
measure.  This finding reveals the existence of systematic center-periphery cleavages on 
the issue of federal regulation of regional elections.  Thus the camp that supported greater 
federal oversight of regional elections consisted of legislators elected from republics, 
Unity members, and those elected with gubernatorial help. The camp who opposed 
federal intervention in regional elections consisted of legislators representing regions in 
which incumbent governors were ineligible for reelection, the SPS and Yabloko parties, 
and independents. Although this camp was able to mobilize the majority of votes behind 
the proposal, they failed to meet the two-thirds requirement without the support of the 
Unity party, which at that time controlled 33 percent of the seats. So, the campaign to 
restore regional right to regulate gubernatorial elections failed.   
Conclusion 
 Electoral federalism will remain a controversial issue in Russian center-periphery 
relations for many years to come. The administrative resources at gubernatorial disposal 
make them attractive political allies and create a strong incentive for the president to alter 
the outcome of regional elections to further his political ambitions. This paper attempted 
to explain why national legislators supported federal intervention. The analysis of roll 
call votes revealed that membership in the presidential party coupled with the lack of 
organizational resources were the key factors affecting legislators’ support of federal 
intervention in regional elections which also benefited governors. But legislators were 
also sensitive to regional political situations and were less supportive of federal 
intervention when incumbent governors were ineligible for reelection under regional 
statutes.  
This finding advances the literature on center-periphery in two respects. First, it 
shows that the set of actors involved in bargaining over the distribution of power is more 
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complex than it has been suggested by previous studies. Initially center-periphery 
negotiations on term limits resembled the billiard-ball approach, but later the set of 
relevant actors expanded rapidly to include the Federation Council, the Duma, the party 
leaders. These four actors could have formed variegated coalitions to promote or block 
Putin’s reforms. Therefore, the paper showed that focusing solely on presidential and 
gubernatorial preferences does not always provide accurate characterization of center-
periphery bargaining. Second, the paper also suggested that a zero-sum assumption about 
the nature of center-periphery relations is not always appropriate. Federal encroachment 
does not necessarily disadvantage subnational office holders and more attention should 
be devoted in formal models on identifying potential losers and winners of federal 
reforms.  
Because these conclusions are drawn from the analysis of a single measure, 
further research is required to establish generalizability. This search should develop a 
better explanation of how pre-electoral arrangements between national and subnational 
actors become binding and how they subsequently shape post-electoral negotiations on 




Table 4-1    Empirical Studies of Authority Migration 
Author Outcome  Causal Mechanism Evidence 










Decentralization is an outcome of 
bargaining between governors and 
presidents filtered through the national 
legislative institutions controlled by 
political parties. The structure of 
political parties becomes an intervening 
factor.  Subnational actors’ control over 
nomination of candidates and candidate-
centered electoral system make 
legislators accountable to the regional 
interests and, hence encourage greater 




Fiscal and political 
decentralization at 
municipal and 
regional level in 
Bolivia, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela 1980-mid 
1990s 
The president initiates decentralization 
when his party expects to lose the 
presidency in upcoming elections but 
hopes to win in regional elections.  
Decentralization reduces the cost of 
losing the national office.   
The probability that 
a decentralization 
law will be enacted 
in a country in a 
specific year is 
positively correlated 
with the number of 
local contests won 
by the presidential 
party and negatively 
correlated with the 
loss in the national 











Decentralization sequence reflects the 
distribution of power between the 
president and governors. The former 
prefers administrative, fiscal, and only 
then political, the latter political, fiscal, 
administrative. The choice of starting 
point affects the ultimate level of 
decentralization.   





46 laws enacted in 
Chile 1990-2006 that 
expanded fiscal, 
administrative, 
political autonomy of 
municipal 
governments   
Tests multiple hypotheses of legislators’ 
support of decentralization bills.  
Finds that 
legislators from 
outside the capital 




were less likely to 
support 
decentralization.  





Putin abolished gubernatorial elections 
to reduce electoral uncertainty= and to 
extend terms for his key allies who were 
to step done due to regional term limits.  
Compares 
reappointment rates 
for governors who 
were due to step 
down as the result 
of term limits.  
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Table 4-1 Continued   
Gel’man 
(2009) 
Political, fiscal, and 
administrative centralization in 
Russia 2000-2005 
The national government was able 
to expand is powers because it was 
united while the regions were 
divided and could not overcome 
collective action problem.    
 




Regional noncompliance with the 
federal law in Russia, late 1990s-
early 2000s 
The degree of regional compliance 
was affected by the business 
capture of regional governments.  
The probability 
that the region 
violated  
federal statutes 




had free access 







Table 4-2   Federal Intervention in Regional Elections 
Date Law 
October 3, 1994  Presidential decree established that all heads of regions who were not 
popularly elected will be appointed by the president till the enactment of the 
federal law regulating elections to regional executive branches  
 
May 25, 1995  Constitutional Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the decree 
 
September 17, 1995  Presidential decree postponed elections to regional assemblies till June 1997 
 
March 2, 1996  Presidential decree granted all regions the right to determine the date of 




Presidential decrees mandated elections in selected regions 
 
October 6, 1999  Federal Law on Forming Regional Governments imposed  term limits for 
governors 
July 29, 2000  Amendment to the Law  on  Forming Regional Governments granted the  
President the right to dissolve regional assemblies and dismiss governors if 
regional laws violated  federal statutes 
February 8, 2001  Amendment to Article 5 of the General  Law indirectly extended term limits 
for incumbent governors 
April 4, 2002  Constitution Court  upheld presidential right to dissolve regional assemblies , 
but made court ruling a prerequisite for the dissolution  
 
June 12, 2002  The Law on Fundamental Rights on Elections and Participation in Referenda 
in enabled the federal government to regulate  elections at all levels  
December 11, 2004  Federal Law No. 50, Article 4950 abolished popular election for governors and 
granted  the President the right to appoint governors subject to approval by 
regional assemblies 
 
December 27, 2004  Presidential decree granted the presidential envoys the right to nominate 




Table 4-3     Estimated Marginal Effects 
dy/dx st.err. p-value 
GovSup=1 if supported by gov (H1: β<0) -0.193 0.065 0.003 
Democracy index (H2: β>0) -0.002 0.004 0.555 
TermLimit=1 if gov is not eligible for reelection (H3: β<0) 0.107 0.064 0.095 
Dummy=1 for Republic -0.239 0.086 0.005 
Dummy=1 for Moscow 0.048 0.125 0.702 
Dummy=1 for SMD -0.044 0.074 0.549 
Dummy=1 for Unity -0.533 0.058 0.000 
Unemployment rate   0.010 0.026 0.691 
Log-Likelihood, constant only  = -307.955    
Log-Likelihood, full model = -253.620     
Pseudo R2       = 0.176    
Observations   = 445    
Standard errors are clustered by party and region; dependent var. =1 if a legislator voted to restore  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation posed the question: How does federalism affect 
democratic consolidation?  This dissertation showed that uneven democratization across 
Russian regions undermined democratic processes at the national level. Selecting 
candidates for party lists, undemocratic regional leaders formed rent-seeking coalitions 
with party bosses and then relied on democratic vote mobilization strategies.  Pre-
electoral coalitions impacted legislators’ support of bills that promoted centralization of 
power. In doing so the dissertation advanced the existing literature on party building by 
bringing to the foreground a set of actors--regional governors-- who have been previously 
ignored by the existing party-building literature. These actors have institutional resources, 
name recognition, and social capital that serve as the foundation for top-down 
construction of political parties because they become substitutes for mass-partisanship 
and salient socioeconomic cleavages that usually anchor political parties to the electorate. 
The dissertation also underscored the importance of political communication in party 
building process which escaped the existing literature on voting in transition democracies. 
Furthermore, the dissertation advanced the scant literature on the quality of representation 
and governance in emerging democracies. 
Federalism and Democracy 
Although volumes have been written on economic and politics of federalism, the 
relationship between federalism and democracy is poorly understood because for many 
decades scholars were focusing their attention on its other aspects. Following Musgrave’s, 
Oates’, and Tiebout’s seminal works, the economic literature emphasized efficiency gains 
from decentralization by distinguishing between production and provision of public 
goods.1  The former entails conversion of inputs into outputs, while the latter consists of 
                                                 
1Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); Wallace E. Oates, 
Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972); Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy  64 (October 1956): 416-424. 
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choosing the desired level of output through political processes.2  Centralization produces 
economies of scale but triggers welfare losses when output levels differ from local 
preferences.  Decentralization brings output closer to local preferences but triggers 
efficiency losses.  Therefore, the economic literature sought to assign taxing and 
spending powers among different levels of government to reduce losses along both 
dimensions.3 Political scientists, in their turn, analyzed whether federal institutions 
promote consensus in ethnically diverse societies; how they impact incumbents’ 
accountability, and when they constrain or empower the electorate.4 More recently, 
scholars have undertaken analyzing the factors that sustain federal institutions.5   
Only in the past decade, has the question of the relationship between democracy 
and federalism appeared on the scholarly agenda, giving rise to two competing views. 
The first camp arose from Latin American democratization and postulates that federalism 
impedes “democratic deepening.”  Democratization of Argentina, Brazil, and more 
recently Mexico has been characterized by uneven transition at the national and 
subnational levels, with the latter lagging behind the former.  This prompted scholars to 
coin the term “regional authoritarianism” to describe failed democratic consolidation in 
selected provinces and subsequently to develop theories explaining cross-regional 
variation in the speed of democratization.  A consensus then  emerged that extra-regional 
factors affected regional political development.  Subnational leaders could successfully 
derail democratization in their regions as long as they could prevent the entrance on the 
scene actors bearing resources from outside the region, in this manner changing the 
balance of power between the oppressive incumbent and the liberal opposition.6  The 
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second camp examined the link between national and subnational political processes and 
argued that federal institutions could promote democratic consolidation by enabling 
opposition leaders to develop a reputation for sound governance.  Opposition leaders in 
new democracies usually lack office- holding experience useful for buttressing their 
campaign promises.  Fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization enables the 
opposition leaders to build such experience on a smaller scale and subsequently convince 
voters that they can outperform incumbents.7  
This dissertation examined the effects of federalism on democratic consolidation 
through the lenses of partisan politics.  Parties to a democracy are what arteries are to a 
human body.  They link citizens to decision-makers by facilitating the flow of 
information between civil and political societies. Each dissertation chapter, therefore, 
examines how federal institutions impacted three most important functions performed by 
parties: candidate selection, campaigning, and governing.  To date, the literature on 
political parties in federal systems has treated these functions in isolation from each other: 
scholars interested in the recruitment of candidates examined how federal arrangements 
affect the relationship between local and national party branches; scholars interested in 
campaigning studied how federalism influenced politicians’ decision to form regional vs. 
national parties; and scholars interested in governing focused on the effect federal 
institutions on party discipline in a legislature.8  
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Rather than studying each of these functions in isolation from each other, this 
dissertation examined how the choice of undemocratic practices at one stage could 
contaminate the process at subsequent stages. The dissertation explicitly focused on the 
interaction between the presidential party and regional governors, who had not always 
shared democratic ideals.  The discussion began with the puzzle of gubernatorial refusals 
to be seated as national legislators after winning seats in the Duma elections. Contrary to 
the fundamental assumption of the rational choice paradigm which postulates that elected 
officials want to be reelected to higher office, Russian governors headed the party ballot 
in the Duma elections and after winning their seats turned around and abdicated them in 
favor of candidates ranking lower on the ballot. The empirical analysis in Chapter 2 
revealed that governors ran as poster candidates to compensate the party for shortfalls in 
campaign resources. By enlisting governors as candidates, regional party bosses’ gained 
access to gubernatorial political machines but in exchange granted governors the right to 
select other candidates for the ballot. Governors placed their allies on the party ballot and 
then ran as poster candidates to get them elected.  
Chapter 3 then went on to examine the vote mobilization strategies of poster 
candidates and showed that governors mobilized voters behind the presidential party by 
creating an information vacuum around the opposition candidates. Controlled media 
disproportionally focused on governors and their running mates, turning the Internet into 
the only uncensored source of information about the opposition. Chapter 3 used macro- 
and micro-level data to estimate the impact of Internet availability on voter political 
behavior and found that Internet access was strongly correlated with votes won by the 
opposition. Thus, the undemocratic and clandestine nature of candidate selections 
facilitated the use of campaign practices incompatible with democratic processes.  
Chapter 4 shifted attention to legislators’ behavior in the Duma, especially 
focusing on legislators’ voting record. The chapter showed that legislators elected with 
gubernatorial help were more likely to vote for policies beneficial to governors even 
when these measures undermined the democratic processes in the regions. In this manner 
a vicious cycle was activated. Governors, who dominated the candidate nomination 
process, selected candidates based on personal loyalty and used undemocratic means to 
get them elected.  Once in office, these new legislators enacted policies that further 
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consolidated gubernatorial control over regional politics and buttressed their political 
machines. Thus, national party dependence on regional political machines contaminated 
democratic processes at the national level and effectively derailed Russia’s 
democratization. 
Why Russia? 
Russia was chosen for this analysis because its abysmal failure to democratize has 
not yet been fully understood.  Russian politics of the 1990s exhibited, encouragingly, 
many democratic features. Elections were held regularly, were contested by multiple 
parties, and the outcomes were surrounded by uncertainty.  Independent media were 
beginning to emerge, and autonomous economic society was in the making.  Although 
pluralistic, Russia of the 1990s was far from being a consolidated democracy because 
many institutions necessary for effective democratic governance were missing. Russia’s 
“democratization backwards” undermined the nascent state. As Rose and Shin noted, 
unlike Western Europe in which the modern state was established before the advent of  
mass enfranchisement,  in Russia political reforms preceded reforms of state institutions. 
Too politically costly to implement, state reforms were delayed, rendering the post-Soviet 
state paralyzed by corruption and captive to special interests.9 The weak state hindered 
the rule of law, especially at the subnational level where regional statues frequently 
contradicted the democratic principles laid out in federal constitutions.  Political society 
was weak too with political parties being neither anchored to constituents through 
ossified social cleavages nor integrated into regional politics.10  Weak citizen 
commitment to democratic values further complicated the situation. As survey data 
revealed, although the masses and elites shared the same definition of democracy, their 
views diverged on the extent of the state’s involvement in the economy. The majority of 
the elites supported a free-market, whereas the masses wanted greater state regulation of 
the economy.11 As Gibson showed, mass democratic values were “a mile wide, but an 
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inch deep” because participate in elections was not backed by the commitment to 
preserve personal liberty at all costs.12    
These anomalies were not peculiar to Russia only: the rest of Eastern Europe was 
in the midst of similar transformation, and the world hoped that Russia would gradually 
evolve into a consolidated democracy.   The 2004 Presidential election in Russia proved 
otherwise. This election saw the incumbent President Vladimir Putin reelected for a 
second term at a time when his party was controlling two-thirds of the Duma seats, 
marking the beginning of a new political order which has been characterized as 
“managed pluralism,” “electoral authoritarianism,” and  “dominant party regime.”13 All 
these terms imply that instead of converging to a liberal democracy, Russia became a 
regime in which the dominant party sustained itself in office by tight state control of the 
mass media, politicized enforcement of the rule of law, electoral fraud, and targeted 
intimidation of the opposition. Opposition leaders have described the current political 
situation thus: “Journalists and politicians critical of the government are murdered, no 
arrests are made, and nobody is brought to justice. Businessmen who take an interest in 
politics are arrested, exiled or sentenced to hard labor, and have their assets seized by the 
state. The Kremlin controls the media, which operates under conditions of direct and 
indirect censorship. Political officials are appointed, or, where elections are held, the 
outcomes are predetermined. The parliament is a mechanical rubber stamp filled with 
secret security agents.”14   
 Two institutions were blamed for the above outcome: superpresidentialism and 
federalism. The super-powerful presidency was a legacy of Yeltsin’s struggle with the 
Communists in the Supreme Soviet. As McFaul pointed out, unlike in Southern Europe 
where democratic institutions emerged from an elite compromise, Russian liberal 
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reformers needed to overcome the armed opposition of the supporters of the ancien 
régime. The strong presidency became a legacy of that victory.  Fish went on to show that 
superpresidentialism became detrimental to Russian democratization because it 
discouraged party government in the Duma, rendering it incapable of checking the 
presidential abuses of power.  The elites viewed parties not as institutions of governance 
but simply as vehicles for attaining the presidency. Therefore, instead of parties 
presidential hopefuls built disposable personality-centered umbrella organizations devoid 
of policy programs. These negative effects of the strong presidency were further 
aggravated by Russia’s natural resource endowment, which undermined elites’ 
commitment to economic reforms.  Abundant oil and natural gas resources bred 
corruption among high-level officials, who could sustain themselves in office only by 
reducing the political openness of the system in order to preserve their economic 
dominance.  In this manner, the winners of partial reforms delayed further 
democratization.15 
Unlike Fish who claims that democracy was destroyed from above, Ross claims 
that it was subverted from below by undermining nascent democratic values within the 
electorate. He writes, “One of the most destructive legacies which Russia inherited from 
the Soviet Union was its ethno-territorial form of federalism,” which gave rise to 
asymmetric system of center-periphery relations and weakened the post-Soviet state. 16 
State weakness manifested itself in Moscow’s inability to put to stop civil rights abuses 
that were  especially prevalent in regions with republic status. To get reelected, 
incumbent governors manipulated electoral rules and candidate registration procedures, 
padded election results, and intimidated the opposition. Such undemocratic practice 
undercut the fragile Russian political culture and led to the rise of “federation without 
federalism,” i.e., the situation in which federal structures went unbuttressed by the 
democratic and legalistic values without which the federation could not be viable.   
Reuter and Remington explaining the United Russia’s rise to power also point to 
the importance of federal institutions. They claim that subnational leaders orchestrated 
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the rise of a one-party state by agreeing to transfer their electioneering resources to 
Moscow in exchange for Putin’s promise to sustain their decision-making power later. 
Thus, the one-party state emerged because national and subnational actors successfully 
resolved the commitment problem.17   
Not only did this dissertation provide empirical evidence that governors played a 
crucial role in bringing United Russia to power, it also showed that voters and legislators 
were the key players behind regime transformation. Fish, Ross, Reuter and Remington all 
overlooked that both Putin and United Russia have had a strong popular base and that 
many Putin reforms were enacted at the time when the Duma was still pluralistic. 
Therefore, rather than looking at peculiar features of the Russian presidency or 
federalism, the dissertation brought to the foreground the actors neglected by the previous 
studies—voters and legislators-- and revealed why and how governors succeeded in 
manipulating them. By examining the interaction among governors, party bosses, 
legislators, and voters the dissertation uncovered micro-level factors that propelled 
Russia’s transition to a one party-state.  
Voters and Legislators in Electoral Authoritarianisms   
This dissertation also demonstrated that gubernatorial involvement in national 
elections brought about a drastic change in voter decision-making processes. This 
conclusion emerges from comparing of models of voting in electoral authoritarianisms 
with those of transition democracies. Elections in one-party states never displace the 
ruling party, making electoral outcomes certain.  In transitional regimes, on the other 
hand, elections are characterized by high uncertainty not only about winners but also 
about post-election state-society relations. These drastic differences prompted scholars to 
develop separate models of voter behavior for each regime type. Transitologists assumed 
that most parties entered elections tabula rasa and, hence, that voters had the same 
amount of information about contestants. Therefore, similarly to the Western countries, 
voters’ choices at the polls were affected by socio-economic identities, partisan 
attachments, macro-economic conditions, policy-preferences, and attitudes toward 
leaders. These models assumed that there existed no systemic differences in the amount 
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of information available to voters about parties competing for office in transition 
democracies.18 The literature on voting in hegemonic party states, on the contrary, 
emphasized informational asymmetries between the incumbent party and challengers. It 
claimed that to unseat the dominant party, the opposition must credibly demonstrate that 
its victory would improve economic conditions. This is a daunting task for party that 
never before held office because voters form expectations about the economy based on 
politicians’ past performance and tend not to believe actors who have never held the 
office in the past. Thus, dominant party regimes are characterized by systemic 
asymmetries in the amount of available information between incumbents and 
challengers.19  
This dissertation underscored the importance of informational asymmetries for 
United Russia’s rise to power. Building on the literature on strategic communication in 
the United States, Chapter 3 showed that governors were able to create informational 
asymmetries which strengthened popular support for the presidential party. The effect of 
gubernatorial backing of emerging presidential parties was similar to reputation for 
macro policy that the incumbent party enjoys in non-democratic regimes. Governors were 
in office longer than the nascent presidential party, and by affiliating with the presidential 
party they transformed voters’ expectations about its performance. These expectations 
then entered the voter decision-making calculus along with partisan and social identities.  
Given that subnational elites constructed, shaped, and framed voters’ prospective 
evaluation of parties, future studies of voting in Russia will have to account for the effect 
of the elite strategic communication on voter behavior. This can be accomplished by 
bridging the literature on the Internet and politics with the literature on democratization. 
Unlike the 1990s when less than one percent of Russia’s population had access to the 
Internet, in 2007 already twenty percent of adults, about 18 millions, used the Internet 
either at home at work.20 The Internet will become even more important for Russian 
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elections when the “digital generation” reaches voting age. Given that Russian citizens 
become eligible to vote at 18, in less than two decades, 20 more millions of new voters, 
who are currently under 15, will be as used to computers as their parents are used to TV. 
The study of voting behavior of this new generation of Internet-literate voters, unscarred 
by economic hardships of the Yeltsin years, may prove to become a fruitful angle for 
understanding Russia’s democratization.     
Voters are not the only actors who could have prevented the rise of Putin’s regime 
in the 2000s. Legislators could have blocked his reforms by casting their ballots 
vigilantly, especially during Putin’s first term when the United Russia party had not yet 
subsumed most of the opposition parties. Unfortunately, they did not. As Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation demonstrated, instead of safeguarding regional democratic institutions 
and protecting the federal constitution, legislators chose to advance their self-interests. 
Elected with gubernatorial help, legislators sought to protect their patrons by expanding 
their terms in office even though this measure pushed regions farther along an 
authoritarian path. This finding suggests that the governor-legislator relations deserve 
further investigation. The scarcity of roll call data impeded systematic analysis of 
Russian legislators’ behavior; so, only a handful of studies has thus far  been conducted. 
These studies, ponder over institutional determinants of party discipline while ignoring to 
examine regional influence on national policymakers. This dissertation is thus the first to 
focus on such a link as well as the first to provide empirical evidence of this connection.   
The question of regional influence can be investigated further by looking at other 
manifestations of regional pressures, particularly by examining the success rate of bills 
introduced directly to the Duma by regions. By introducing bills themselves, governors 
and regional assembly members circumvented national legislators elected from the region. 
Further analysis of why this practice became widespread during the Putin administration 
may point to the weakness of ties between national and regional office holders and 
systematic differences in bill success rate depending on its region of origin.  
Governors and the Future of Russia’s Political Development 
 Although the dissertation demonstrated that governors orchestrated Untied 
Russia’s rise to power, their future role in Russian politics will be limited.  The abolition 
of popular gubernatorial elections undermined gubernatorial voter mobilization power. 
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Appointed governors have limited vote mobilizing experience and are perceived by 
voters as accountable to Moscow, rather than to their region. As the literature on strategic 
communication shows, voters’ knowledge of a speaker’s policy position facilitates 
intelligent choices at the polls. When voters know the policy position of the interest 
group that endorses a candidate, they make utility- maximizing decisions without even 
knowing candidates’ platforms. Prior to the abolition of popular elections, many voters 
perceived popularly elected governors as guardians of the region’s interests, while 
appointed governors became perceived as Moscow’s stewards.  Such a switch in popular 
perception should have undermined the persuasiveness of governors’ political 
endorsements while increasing their temptation to pad electoral results to deliver victory 
to United Russia. It is not, therefore, surprising that President Medvedev recently 
attempted to restore the seeming harmony between gubernatorial and voter interests by 
granting regional assemblies the power to nominate gubernatorial candidates, but the 
governors are still considered as presidential appointees.   
 The expansion of the presidential term from four to seven years became the 
second blow to gubernatorial autonomy from the President. All governors serve for five 
years, with variegated dates of reappointment.21 When the presidential term was limited 
to four years, substantial carryovers from the previous administration’s appointees 
existed. Given that the president’s term was for less than five years, he could not, in 
theory at least, dismiss all the governors and complete the cycle of gubernatorial 
appointments before the end of his term. The governors whose terms spilled over from 
the previous administration could then be recruited by the opposition. The seven-year 
term, which will come into effect in 2013, will allow the president to complete the cycle 
of gubernatorial appointments prior to the expiration of his first term, in this way further 
consolidating his power.   
 Governors’ increasing dependence on the President reduces the probability of 
their defection to the opposition. Therefore, the opposition should turn to younger voters 
as potential agents of democratization.  Currently, the opposition parties lag behind 
United Russia’s youth mobilization effort. United Russia is the sole party that reserves 25 
                                                 




percent of its seats for candidates under 30; it is the only party possessing an extensive 
network of sports organizations that reach out to school kids, and it is the only party 
associated with an unprecedentedly young and energetic ex-president. The opposition can 
counterbalance United Russia’s youth mobilization efforts via Internet resources.  Web-
based forums do not require as many resources as party conventions; e-newsletters are 
less costly than bulky party leaflets and newspapers; and web-advertising is more 
affordable than state-controlled media. Thus, the opposition’ electoral success will 
depend not on its effectiveness wooing governors but the speed with which it masters 
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